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Jurisdiction pursuant to rule 42 (a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this matter is transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for 
disposition. Issue is the error of Third District Court Judge Randall 
Skanchy interpretation of Utah Code 57-6-4 Certain persons 
considered to hold under color of title. 
Standard of review: This issue presents a question of law which is 
reviewed for correctness. Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure 
(URAP) Rule 3. Appeal as of right from district courts final orders. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER CASE NO. 050918496 
Judge Randall N. Skanchy Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
In the discussion section "plaintiff Timothy did not live by himself on 
the property" ignores the partial sentence of UC 57-6-4 (2) (a) "by 
himself, or by those under whom he claims,". Skanchy has also 
included the terminology of sole owner in the definition of good faith, 
forgetting laws of marriage, incorporation, partnerships, issuing of 
stocks and investments. Skanchy did not address UC 57-6-4 (2) (c) 
the payment of the ordinary county taxes for any one year and two 
1 
years have lapsed without repayment by the owner. 
UC 57-6-4 has two main sections for meeting requirements, the first 
(1) is per tax sale by itself gives color of title, not applicable in this 
case. 
The second has four provisions which any of the first three (2) (a) i -
iii with the iv being met occupant / plaintiff has color of title, ref. Utah 
Code 57-6-4. Exhibit 1. Nobody has denied that the iii (third section) 
or iv (fourth section ) has been met. 
Statement of the case. 
This appeal is to overturn the Third District Court decision, denying 
Appellant / Robert Timothy, Color of Title to reimbursement of 
property taxes paid on the 2720 South Chadwick Street property and 
valuable improvements to the same property. The lower court did 
grant defendant Appellee / Parley Timothy's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, ref. MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER page 3. 
Exhibit 2. 
Statement of facts: 
1. Parley H.J. Timothy / Appellee is the owner of record at the 
2 
Salt Lake County Recorders Office as of February 2006, for the lot at 
2720 South Chadwick Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106. 
2. Parley Timothy in the final order of Quieting Title action was 
awarded the Chadwick property in November of 2005. 
3. Robert Timothy / Appellant lived at the Chadwick property from 
November 1996 until March 2006 with Mark Timothy. 
4. Robert Timothy and Mark Timothy did pay the ordinary county 
taxes from 1979 - 2005 except for 2002 and each made valuable 
improvements while living there. 
5. No rental agreements were ever made, no rent was ever paid. 
6. Upstairs interior is sub par, not rentable due to Parley Timothy 
start of remodeling but never finished. The basement was gutted in 
1976 and has not been worked on at all since 1976, used as storage 
and utility room. Property since March 2006 has been vacant and not 
considered rentable. 
7. Alice Jolley and Cephes Halley bought the Chadwick property 
in December 1960, as Joint Tenants, divorced in 1963. The deed was 
never changed. Alice Jolley died 1975 with Holographic Will that was 
3 
never probated. Will left property to her son and his sons. Cephes 
Halley died 1989. Chadwick Property was in Cephes Halley's name 
until February 2006. 
8. Parley Timothy gave Mark Timothy money to pay off mortgage 
by 1978 some times making double payments. 
9. Parley Timothy is the only living son of Alice Jolley, step-son to 
Cephes Halley. 
Summary of arguments: 
Robert Timothy and Mark Timothy meet all of the requirements of 
UC 57-6-4 to hold Color of Title, did make improvements under good 
faith of partial interest in Chadwick property and has asked for a trial 
for determination of reimbursement amount for taxes paid and 
improvements made. 
Detail of Arguments: 
Utah Code Section 57-6-4 Certain persons considered to hold under 
color of title. 
Section (1) A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale made 
by the proper person or officer has color of title within the meaning of 
4 
this chapter, whether or not the person or officer has sufficient 
purchaser at the time of the sale. 
Not applicable since the property has not been bought in this manner. 
Section (2)(a)(i) Any person has color of title who has occupied a 
tract of real estate by himself or those under whom he claims, for the 
term of five years, 
Robert Timothy lived at the Chadwick Street property from 1996 to 
2006, Mark Timothy lived at the Chadwick Street property from 1976 
to 2006, each has color of title. 
Section (2)(a)(ii) or who has occupied it for less time, if he or those 
under whom he claims, have at any time during the occupancy with 
knowledge or consent, express or implied, of the real owner made 
any valuable improvements on the real estate, 
To recover costs of valuable improvements the occupant(s) must also 
meet the good faith clause of Utah Code Section 57-6-1. Exhibit 3. 
Part of the $23,711 Appellant's claims for improvements include 
labor for projects that Parley Timothy had paid for raw materials and 
supervised the installation of the north and west windows and the 
5 
larger driveway, so Parley Timothy not only knew by expressed or 
implied consent but by actual participation with Robert Timothy. Thus 
Robert Timothy has color of title. The two cited Supreme Court 
cases, Ute-Cal v. Sathers and Hidden Meadows v. Mills by Parley 
Timothy's counsel that denied color of title in each case, found that 
those who had made improvements had acted willfully and with 
malice against the owner or had Lis Pendens applied against them 
and failed good faith in dealing with the other parties before and 
after legal action was started, ref. Ute-Cal v. Sathers page 1, first 
paragraph Exhibit 4. and Hidden Meadows v. Mills page 6, Hall, 
Justice: second paragraph. Exhibit 5. 
In neither case did the claimants occupy the land for five years and 
no mention of who paid the ordinary county taxes was made. In Jeffs 
v. Stubbs Exhibit 6. the court found for the appellee to have color of 
title by having occupied the real estate for five years and also had 
color of title by having made improvements to the real estate that was 
encouraged by the trustees of the real estate, ref. Jeff v. Stubb page 
6 
4, paragraph 4. "The term owner is often used to characterize the 
possessor of an interest less than that of absolute ownership, such 
as...". Robert Timothy's belief in part ownership in the Chadwick 
property is still an interest since it was in his grandmothers and step-
grandfathers name until 2006. 
With Jeffs v. Stubbs the land was then considered charitable and tax 
exempt no taxes had been required. The appellees knew the title of 
the land was in the Trusts name and not theirs but were encouraged 
to build homes for their use as long as they lived in the homes by the 
trustees. Robert Timothy lived in the Chadwick property and made 
improvements to improve the quality of living there and to meet 
housing standards that the City of Salt Lake had written a letter to 
Cephes Halley noting the deficiencies. Since the appellees in Jeffs 
v. Stubbs were polygamist it can be assumed they lived with there 
wives and children in the home(s) and did not live by himself(s). 
Robert Timothy claims the 1969 Holographic Will of Alice Jolley, 
grandmother to Appellant, gave owner interest to him, his brothers 
and father (Appellee). Robert Timothy lived with his brother 
7 
who also was a beneficiary of the Alice Jolley's Will. Ref. Alice 
Jolley's Dairy Page February 24, 1969. Exhibit 7. If the Will had 
been probated in a timely manner by Parley Timothy, the 
Determination of Heirs in 2005 would not have given Parley Timothy 
sole inheritor rights, and the Quieting of Title action on the rights of 
Alice Jolley to the Chadwick property allowing Parley Timothy to put 
the title in his name only. Robert Timothy was a minor between 
1975 and 1981. Alice Jolley died in 1975. 
Section (2)(a)(iii) or if he or those under whom he claims have at any 
time during the occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes on the real 
estate for any one year, and two years have elapsed without a 
repayment by the owner. 
Robert Timothy and those under whom he claims Mark Timothy, has 
contributed to in whole and part, have paid over 25 years of the 
ordinary county taxes from 1979 to 2005 excluding 2002 that 
Parley Timothy did pay when he planned to take control of the 
property, ref. Trial transcript Timothy v. Timothy Case No. 
040904245 page 20 line 17-23. Exhibit 8. In Parley Timothy's 
8 
statement he claimed that the payment of taxes was in lui of rent. ref. 
Affidavit of Parley H.J. Timothy page 2. Exhibit 9. If so why did he 
pay 2002 taxes without telling anybody and not demand or request 
rent for 2002, if he claimed that tax payments was an agreement for 
his permission to occupy the real estate. There is not one person 
that Robert Timothy knows, not even the wife of Parley Timothy, that 
would state that Parley Timothy ever claimed to be the sole owner of 
the property until 2004. The 2003 building permit for the new 
driveway has Parley Timothy as the contractor stating "son of owner" 
while the 1992 roof building permit has Mark Timothy as owner. 
Section (2)(a)(iv) and the occupancy is continued up to the time at 
which the action is brought by which the recovery of the real estate is 
obtained. 
Filing of the Color of Title action was in November 2005. Occupancy 
was held until March 2006 by Robert Timothy. 
Section (2)(b) The person's rights shall pass to his assignees or 
representatives. 
Mark Timothy has assigned all of his rights to Robert Timothy. 
9 
Section (3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give tenants 
color of title against their landlords or give any person a claim under 
color of title to school and institutional trust lands as defined in 
Section 53C-1 -103. 
The Chadwick property is private property. 
There has never been a rental agreement for occupancy of the 
Chadwick Street property, while Kaysville property owned by Parley 
Timothy and Afton Timothy has been rented and is currently rented 
by Matthew Timothy (son of owners) and his family. After the passing 
of Alice Jolley the Chadwick property was occupied by Matthew 
Timothy with no rent, then by Parley and Mark Timothy with no rent. 
During the occupation of Parley and Mark Timothy extensive 
unfinished remodeling occurred to the upstairs and the basement was 
gutted. No remodeling has occurred to the basement since the 
1970's. In 1992 the property had fallen into such disrepair that the 
City of Salt Lake filed court action to require the property, mainly the 
roof, be brought up to standard. The action was initially filed against 
Cephes Halley then changed to Mark Timothy as the owner. Parley 
10 
Timothy knew of this action and attended the hearing. Parley 
Timothy made no statement of ownership at this hearing. The Court 
ordered Mark Timothy to repair the roof himself or pay for a 
contractor to do so. Mark Timothy complied by paying for all material 
and most of the labor with some labor help of Donald Timothy and 
Parley Timothy's truck to haul away the old roof debris. Since the 
eviction of Robert Timothy in March 2006, no one has lived at the 
Chadwick property and it has not been rented due to its condition. 
Robert Timothy's improvements to the upstairs had made the 
property more livable but not to a level that would make it rentable. 
Mr. Sanders the Appelllee's attorney has claimed that if rent had 
been charged it would off set the taxes and improvements paid by 
Robert Timothy and Mark Timothy. Since the property has not been 
rentable since the1970's due to Parley Timothy actions and no lease 
agreement has ever been made, the claim to offset Robert Timothy's 
claims is unenforceable or unrecognizable since there was no 
agreement verbally or in writing for rent. 
Conclusion for relief sought: Grant Robert Timothy Color of Title, and 
11 
if the Appellate Court doesn't have the authority to grant the 
$45,284.66 for taxes and $23,711 for improvements, re-imbursement 
asked in the Color of Title action, then remand the case back to the 
Third District Court for trial. 
Since this case has gone on for over a year Robert Timothy asks for 
an additional $5,850 ($650/month since March) asked in the original 
filing or an additional year of interest for each year of none 
reimbursed taxes in the amount of $2,330 and 10% of improvements 
value of $2,371. 
Robert Timothy Pro Se 
Exhibit 1 
57-6-4. Certain persons considered to hold under color of title. 
(1) A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax sale made by the proper person or officer has color 
of title within the meaning of this chapter, whether or not the person or officer has sufficient authority to 
sell, unless the want of authority was known to the purchaser at the time of the sale. 
(2) (a) Any person has color of title who has occupied a tract of real estate by himself, or by those 
under whom he claims, for the term of five years, or who has occupied it for less time, if he, or those 
under whom he claims, have at any time during the occupancy with the knowledge or consent, express 
or implied, of the real owner made any valuable improvements on the real estate, or if he or those under 
whom he claims have at any time during the occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes on the real estate 
for any one year, and two years have elapsed without a repayment by the owner, and the occupancy is 
continued up to the time at which the action is brought by which the recovery of the real estate is 
obtained. 
(b) The person's rights shall pass to his assignees or representatives. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give tenants color of title against their landlords or 
give any person a claim under color of title to school and institutional trust lands as defined in Section 
53C-1-103. 
Amended by Chapter 39, 2005 General Session 
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Exhibit 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TPIIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT TIMOTHY, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 050918495 
vs. : 
PARLEY TIMOTHY, : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant. : 
Defendant Parley Timothy (hereinafter "defendant Timothy") has filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment in this matter asking the Court to grant 
Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiff Robert Timothy's (hereinafter 
"plaintiff Timothy") Complaint. The matter has been fully briefed by the 
parties and is ready for disposition. The Court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 Defendant Timothy has sole interest and ownership in property 
located at 2720 S. Chadwick Street in Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter 
"property"). (Judgment Quieting Title) 
2 Plaintiff Timothy occupied the Property from 1987 to 1991 and 
November of 1996 to MarchT 2006. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
in Case No. 060902074) 
3 Mar'k Timothy, the brother of plaintiff Timothy, occupied the 
Property during that time and for a period of 20 years. (Defendant 
TIMOTHY V. TIMOTHY PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Timothy Statement of Facts No. 5; Plaintiff Timothy Statement of Facts, 
unnumbered) 
4 Plaintiff Timothy believed himself to be a joint owner of the 
Property 'with his brother and defendant Timothy. (Defendant Timothy 
Statement of Facts No. 7; plaintiff Timothy Statement of Facts, 
unnumbered) 
DISCUSSION 
Utah Code Ann., Section 57-6-1, et seq., commonly known as the Utah 
Occupying Claimant statute provides relief to parties who provide 
improvements to real property in which they believe they have an 
ownership interest. Here, defendant Timothy argues that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff Timothy made improvements 
in good faith to the Property because he had full knowledge that he was 
not the sole owner of the Property. The relevant sections of the Utah 
Occupying Claimant statute are as follows: 
57-6-1; Where an occupant of real estate has color of title to 
the real estate, and in good faith has made valuable 
improvements on the real estate, and is afterwards in a proper 
action found not to be the owner.... 
57-6-4 (1) ; A purchaser in good faith at any judicial or tax 
sale made by the proper person or officer has color of 
title.... 
(2) (a) Any person has color of title who has occupied a tract 
of real estate by himself, or by those under whom he claims, 
for the term of five years.... 
TIMOTHY V. TIMOTHY PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Here it is undisputed that plaintiff Timothy did not live by himself on 
the Property, nor did he have any belief that he was the sole owner of 
the Property. Indeed, plaintiff Timothy avers that he was a joint owner 
of the Property. Thus, plaintiff Timothy did not have color of title, 
and therefore nor did he place improvements in the property in good faith 
believing himself to be the sole owner of the Property. Since the issue 
presented has been authoritatively decided, the Court sees no reason to 
hold a hearing in this matter. 
3ased upon these undisputed facts, the Court hereby grants defendant 
Timothy's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for Mr. Parley Timothy is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this ruling. 
Dated this _day of October, 2 0 06. 
'J 
RANDALL^TT' SK^fCHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
TIMOTHY V. TIMOTHY PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
BAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order, to m e rollowing, this I I? day 
of October, 2006: 
Robert Timothy 
Pro se 
679 S. Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Gregory J. Sanders 
Gary T. Wright 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchance Piace; Fourth Floe 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Exhibit 3 
57-6-1. Stay of execution of judgment of possession. 
Where an occupant of real estate has color of title to the real estate, and in good faith has made 
valuable improvements on the real estate, and is afterwards in a proper action found not to be the owner, 
no execution shall issue to put the owner in possession of the real estate after the filing of a complaint as 
hereinafter provided, until the provisions of this chapter have been complied with. 
Amended by Chapter 299, 1995 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 57J)6002.ZIP 1,781 B> tei ; 
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Exhibit 4 
(Cite as: 605 P.2d 1240) • 
60S P.2d 1240 
bupiume Court ot Utah. 
UTE-CAL LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Pldintiff, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
Robert R. SATHER and Bonnie Lee Sather, Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Respondents. 
No. 16017. 
Jan. 11, 1980. 
Action was brought by developer against guarantor to regain possession of tract of land used as 
collateral for loan from bank. The Fourth District Court, Unitah County, David Sam, J., entered 
judgment finding guarantor guilty of acting maliciously and wilfully in gaining possession of tract, 
assessing amount developer owed guarantor, and finding that developer suffered no damages, and 
cross appeals were taken. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that: (1) evidence was sufficient to 
support finding that guarantor acted wilfully and maliciously in transaction; (2) amount jury 
determined that developer owed guarantor had legitimate basis in the evidence; (3) decision of trial 
court, which found that jury had considered issue of interest in its deliberations and that its award in 
fact incorporated interest payment, not to award interest was not arbitrary or capricious; and (4) 
developer, which failed to object to alleged insufficiency of verdict as to damages suffered as resull 




[1] KeyCite Notes 
v^>266 Mortgages 
C-266IX Foreclosure by Exercise of Power of Sale 
€-'266k379 k. Wrongful Foreclosure. Most Cited Cases 
In action by developer against guarantor to regain possession of tract of land that had been used ai 
collateral for loan from bank, evidence, which indicated that guarantor agreed to cancel guaranty 
agreement for $50,000 loan and actually signed cancellation clause on copy of original agreement, 
was sufficient to support conclusion that guarantor acted wilfully and maliciously toward developer. 
|KC 
£2] KeyCite Notes 
<^3o Appeal and Error 
{ -30XVI Review 
o?3QXVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and Findings 
c-30XVig)2 Verdicts 
<~_30kl003 Against Weight of Evidence 
c- 30kl003(4) k. Preponderance of Evirinn i Most Cited Cases 
In viewing evidence, Supreme Court will upset jury verdict only upon showing by appealing party that 




[3J KeyCite Notes 
file://E:\ute-cal%201and%20v%20sather_files\CAGXCR43 files\CABTLN5F files\CA6... 12/20/2006 




Cw3Qk930(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
In determining if there was sufficient evidence to support jur y's verdict, Supreme Court will consider 
those facts which most strongly support verdict and, where there is any conflict in the evidence, 
Supreme Court will consider as true that evidence which supports verdict. 
[4] KeyCite Notes 
€-266 Mortgages 
C-266IX Foreclosure by Exercise of Power of Sale 
c^266k379 k. Wrongful Foreclosure. Most Cited Cases 
Where final sum determined by jury to be owing from developer to guarantor of loan was amount 
guarantor paid bank minus $25,000 delivered to guarantor upon disbursement of loan proceeds, 
amount awarded as owing from developer to guarantor had legitimate basis in the evidence in 
developer's action to regain possession of tract used as collateral for loan from bank. 
B 
[51 KeyCite Notes ^ 
0^388 1 i ial 
0388IX Verdict 
c^388IX(A) General Verdict 
C^388k345 k. Objections and Exceptions. Most Cited Cases 
Although issue of interest on sum owed guarantor was ostensibly raised by the pleadings in 
developer's action to regain possession of tract used as collateral for loan from bank, guarantor, wtIO 
did not voice his claim until after jury was dismissed, waived jury's consideration of this specific issue 
and instead presented it to trial court for final determination. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 49, 49(a). 
m 
\6] KeyCite Notes ^ 
€^219 Interest 
o*219I Rights and Liabilities in General 
c^219k21 k. Verdicts, Findings, and Aw Most QtedjCases 
In developer's action against guarantor to regain possession of tract used as collateral for loan from 
bank, decision of trial court, which found that jury had considered issue of interest on award of 
money owed from developer to guarantor, which found that award in fact incorporated interest 
payment, and which because of this conclusion did not supplement jury's award, not to grant request 
for interest on jury's award was not arbitrary or capricious. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 49(a). 
171 KeyCite Notes ^ 
<^388 Trial 
C-388IX Verdict 
^ 388IX(A) General 
file://E:\ute-cal%201and%20v%20sather files\CAGXCR43 files\CABTLN5F files\CA6... 12/20/2006 
€^388k345 k. u11 r" t'Mp , " " I I M Mi'I M »•)s. Most Cited Cases 
Failure to object to verdict, informal or insufficient on its face, before jury is discharged, waives tflat 
objection. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 47(r). 
[8] KeyCite Notes 
o^388 Trial 
o*388IX Verdict 
o*388IX(A) General verdict 
c^388k345 k. Objections and Exceptions. Most Cited Cases 
Developer, which was under responsibility to object to alleged insufficiency of damages at time 
verdict was rendered in its suit to regain possession of tract used as collateral for loan, and which did 
not avail itself of opportunity to object to verdict before jury was dismissed, waived any later 
objection to its insufficiency. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 47(r). 
*1241 
(Cite as; 605 P.2d 1240, *1241) 
Cullen Y. Christensen of Christensen, Taylor & Moody, Provo, for defenc: slants and cross-
respondents. 
Robert M. McRae of McRae & Deland, Vei i lal, I oi plaii itil i ', respondent J ; IU aoss-appellant. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
The defendants [FNl ] bring this appeal from the jury's special verdict which found them guilty of 
acting maliciously and wilfully in gaining possession of a tract of land near Roosevelt, Utah. The 
defendants also appeal the jury's assessment of the amoui it tl le plaintiff owes them as guarantors of 
a *1242 
(Cite as: 605 P.2d 1240, *1242) — 
loan between the plaintiff and First Security Bank of Utah, and the trial court's refusal to grant 
interest on the amount owed. The plaintiff cross-appealed the jury's determination. It found he 
suffered no damages, because of the acts of the defendants. He requested a new trial on the issue of 
damages. We affirm the jury verdict and decision of the trial court, and deny the plaintiff's request for 
a new trial. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
FNLL Robert R. Sather and his wife Bonnie Lee Sather and First Security Bank of Utah 
were co-defendants in the original action. Bonnie Lee Sather's role in the entire incident 
was passive in nature and she was named in the complaint merely because her name 
was found on the Warranty Deed which Ute-Cal placed in escrow with the bank under 
the guaranty agreement between itself and Sather. The bank while party to the initial 
action is not a party to this present appeal. 
Ute-Cal Land Development Corporation, hereinafter "Ute-Cal/' initiated this action iix district court 
to regain possession of a tract of land known as the Moss Ranch. The property, which the plaintiff 
intended to develop into a recreational facility, was used as collateral for a $40,000 loan received 
from the First Security Bank of Utah, Roosevelt, Utah, hereinafter "Bank." This loan, which Ute-Cal 
applied for on October 11, 1972, was also secured by the personal guarantees of the President of 
Ute-Cal, Pete J. Buffo, hereinafter "Buffo," and the defendants, Robert R. Sather and Bonnie Lee 
Sather, hereinafter collectively "Sather. 
At the time of this first loan Buffo and Robert Sather were close personal friends and business 
associates, and were involved in several assorted business transactions. When Ute-Cal applied for 
the October 11th loan, Buffo acting as President of the corporation entered into an agreement with 
Sather under the terms of which Sather was to receive a Warranty Deed to the Moss Ranch upon 
Ute-Cal's default and Sather's repayment of the loan. A copy of this written agreement 
file://E:\ute-cal%201and%20v%20sather files\CAGXCR43 files\CABTLN5F files\CA6... 12/20/2006 
accompanied by a Wat i ai it ; Deed coi i> 'eyii ig 1:1 i a pi Dpei t) to Sather was delivered to the bank: \A ith a 
note securing the loan. 
The principal factual disputes in the present action stem from a subsequent loan between Ute-Cal 
and the Bank. The reason Ute-Cal borrowed the additional money and the use of the additional funds 
represent the basis of the present controversy. 
Buffo alleged at trial that on September 15, 1973, Sather came to his offic-
and requested Buffo loan him $25,000. In his testimony Buffo explained: 
Q. And what was the purpose of the meeting? 
A. The purpose of the meeting? Bob (Sather) had flown down the night before and said that he had 
to see me on a matter of grave importance. That he had bought some diamonds and was in serious 
financial trouble and needed $25,000. 
Q. Alright and can you relate the rest of the conversation? 
A. Well, I told him that I didn't have $25,000 and he said that he had taken the liberty to go to First 
Security Bank and make arrangements to borrow. At that time the $40,000 loan that we had 
originally taken out I had paid on was down to $20,000 JTN2J and he said that he had made 
arrangements with the bank to make a loan for $50,000 and if I would go ahead and borrow $50,000 
on the property in I Itah, then we could go ahead and give him $25,000 of it. [FN3J 
FN2. The original loan was to be repaid in two installments plus interest and had a 
maturity date of October 1, 1973. 
FN3, I he trust note for the September loan and the guaranty agreement between Buffo 
and Sather both are dated September 15, 1973, corroborating Buffo's testimony that he 
signed those documents on that day in California. 
In contrast to this testimony, Sather claims the money which he received from Ute-Cal was h 
payment of prior debts between the two. Buffo acknowledged monies had been loaned back aiid 1or tl i 
between the two but in his testimony stated: 
. . . I told him, at the September 15, 1973 meeting, that there had been conversations and rumors 
around from other people that he was telling that I owed him money and that I had prepared an 
accounting and sent it to them and that I didn't feel that I owed him any money. 
*1243 
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Buffo explained his motivation in securing the additional funds when he testified: 
I told him (Sather) rather than injure a friendship that I would like to sit down and get the 
accounting done [FN4J and that if he really needed to borrow the money on this, that we would go 
ahead and do this because he had accommodated me before when I was in trouble. 
FN4, This accoi mting is the subject of a separate si lit. 
Subsequent to this meeting Sather returned to Utah and filed the application for the $50,000 loan 
with the bank on September 21 , 1973. Along with the application Sather gave the bank the Trust 
Deed for the Moss Ranch which Buffo had signed and notarized in California. He also gave the bank a 
Guaranty Agreement, between Sather and Ute-Cal, similar to the one entered into between the 
parties at the time of the first loan. 
Concerning his intent in entering into this guaranty agreement Buffo explained: 
Then he (Sather) told me that the bank also would require another this agreement here (indieviting 
the guaranty agreement) besides and I told him that I didn't want to sign an agreement . . . 
. I told him that I didn't want to sign the agreement, have the use of the money. I was borrowing 
the money to give it to him so why should I sign an agreement if I didn't pay it back he would have 
the property. He said well that was the only thing that he could do and the only way that he could get 
the loan through the bank and I said that I will go ahead and sign the agreement providing you go 
ahead and cancel it so as soon as the loan is through I can go ahead and get my documents back 
from the bank and Bob (Sather) said, 'Fine, I will take care of it.' [FN51 
FN_5, I I le |: Jaii itiff h iti c di i ::e :! in s > idei ice a cop ; c ill ' till lis agi eei i lei it I iiicl t :oi itah led E 
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h " \ \ i ">v Sather. 
At the same time Sather presented the bank witl i aii unlimited personal guarantee of any and all 
Ute-Cal debts. 
On September 24, 1973, the disbursement of the loan applied $20,000' to the renewal of the prior 
obligation, and credited the Ute-Cal account with the remaining $30,000. On the following day, 
September 25, 1973, Ute-Cal, under the signature of its President, Pete Buffo, issued a $25,000 
check to Sather. This check was paid by the bank on September 27, 1973. 
This presents the second factual dispute which involves the use of the proceeds of the loan. While 
Sather alleges he immediately applied the Ute-Cal check to the purchase of a savings certificate 
worth $25,000, several discrepancies exist as to the chronology of events surrounding this check and 
the savings certificate purchase. 
A representative of the bank, Verl Haslem, testified the $25,000 check was used to purchase Savings 
Certificate No. 19479. However, while he stated certificates are not issued until they are paid for he 
acknowledged this certificate was dated September 25, 1973, but the check allegedly used as 
payment was not paid until September 27, 1973.[FN6] 
FN6. The two day difference denies the conclusion that the transactions spanned a 
weekend. 
Also, while the certificate was allegedly purchased for cash on September 25, 1973, it was not 
received by the bank as additional collateral until October 16, 1973. Thus, a period of 22 days elapsed 
between the disbursement of the proceeds of the loan and the bank's receipt of the required 
collateral, and 19 days lapsed between the payment of the check and the bank's receipt of the 
required additional collateral.[FN7] 
FN7. Further discrepancies surface concerning the requirement of the bond as additional 
collateral for the second loan. Although the initial loan application, which was received on 
September 21 , 1973, was approved without the requirement of the $25,000 bond the 
final application for approval which was dated October 31 , 1973, explicitly required the 
additional collateral. 
*1244 
(Cite as: 605 P.2d 1240, *1244) 
Ute-Cal paid the first installment of the new loan on October 20, 1973, but failed to pay the following 
installment due on January 20, 1974. On March 25, 1974, Sather paid off the remainder of the Ute-
Cal obligation and accepted delivery of the Warranty Deed. Sather cashed the $25,000 certificate 
and applied this money and $21,500 from his business account to cover the $46,500 which Ute-Cal 
owed the bank under the loan. This amount included both the principal and the interest payments 
due. 
Prior to his acceptance of the Warranty Deed which the bank delivered to him under the terms oi 
Guaranty Agreement, Sather executed on March 15, 1974, a deed conveying the Moss Ranch 
property to James A. Sheya as security for a $70,000 loan. However, when Sather went to record 
this deed on March 25, 1974, he found the plaintiff had caused a Trust Deed covering the property to 
be recorded on November 2, 1973, securing a loan between itself and Silvio Fassio for the sum of 
$150,000. Upon notice of this encumbrance Sather requested and received from First Security Bank 
on April 5, 1974, an assignment of the original note from the $40,000 loan and the Trust Deed 
accompanying the second loan. Sheya later reconveyed the property to Sather, who retained actual 
possession and use of the property until the conclusion of the trial below, [FN8] 
FN8. In a separate occupying claimants suit Sather is attempting to recover the value of 
improvements which he made to the property. These improvements, exceeding $60,000 
in value, include land clearing, irrigation and reservoir construction, evidence an intent 
on Sather's part for continued possession and use. 
Following unsuccessful negotiations between Bi if Io arid Sather concerning the reacquisition of the 
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property and the repayment to Sather of monies expended as guarantor, Ute-Cal initiated the 
present suit to regain possession of the property and recover damages it incun ed by the delivery of 
the Warranty Deed to Sather. Sather counterclaimed against Ute-Cal for monies spent in paying off 
the second loan. 
At the conclusion of the evidence the jur y was presented with a special verdict containing 13 
questions. In answering these the jury found: (a) the second Guaranty Agreement between Sather 
and Buffo dated September 15, 1973, was cancelled prior to the time the Warranty Deed was 
delivered to Sather; (b) after subtracting any monies due Sather, Ute-Cal sustained no direct 
money damages as a result of the delivery of the Warranty Deed to Sather; (c) defendant Sather 
was guilty of wilful and malicious conduct against Ute-Cal, but assessed no punitive damages; (d) 
Ute-Cal was required to make a valid tender of $46,500 or any part thereof to Sather in order to 
regain possession of the Moss Ranch; and (e) Ute-Cal was entitled to the return of the Moss Ranch 
from Sather. 
When the verdict was returned the plaintiff objected to the vagueness of the jury's answer concerning 
the amount owed Sather by Ute-Cal. In response to this objection the trial court submitted two 
additional interrogatories to the jury which asked whether the plaintiff owed any sum of money to 
Sather, and the specific dollar amount. The jury answered "yes" to the former, and stated that Ute-
Cal owed Sather $21,500. No further objections followed these answers and the jury was dismissed 
by the court. 
At the conclusion of the trial the plaintiff moved for a new trial on the issue of damages. Concurrently, 
the defendant Sather moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict to the effect that Sather 
was not guilty of wilful and malicious conduct toward the plaintiff. Sather also submitted to the trial 
court a motion to add interest to the amount found due from the plaintiff. 
The trial court denied all the post-verdict motions of the respective parties and ordered upon the 
plaintiffs payment of $21,500 to Sather all of Sather's claims in and to the Moss Ranch wotild be 
terminated.[FN9] 
FN9. The trial judge excepted and reserved for subsequei it trial questions of law and fact 
pertaining to defendant Sather's claims for the value of improvements rendered to the 
property. 
*1245 
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The two parties appeal the denial of their various motions. The appeal and cross-appeal present four 
questions to this court: 1. Did Sather act wilfully and maliciously toward the plaintiff; 2. Does Sather 
have a right to a higher award for monies expended as guarantor of the loan; 3. Does Sather have a 
right to interest upon the amount due and owing; and 4. Does the plaintiff have the right to a new 
trial on the issue of damages? We will discuss these issues in the above order. 
El 
(1) Sather contends the jury was unjustified in its findings of malicious conduct on the part of 
Sather toward the plaintiff. Throughout the three day trial voluminous testimony and numerous 
pieces of evidence were presented in an effort to reconstruct the circumstances of the transaction in 
question. The plaintiff presented specific evidence that the defendant Sather agreed to cancel their 
guaranty agreement for the $50,000 loan and actually signed a cancellation clause on a copy of the 
original agreement. He never informed the bank of this cancellation, and subsequently accepted 
delivery of the Warranty Deed from the bank under the terms of this agreement. 
Similarly, several factual questions are raised by the evidence surrounding the renewal of the original 
loan. Specifically, representations made to Buffo by Sather concerning the requirement of a guaranty 
agreement between them, the questionable sequence of events involving the savings certificate, and 
the ultimate use of the proceeds of the loan to purchase the savings certificate support the conclusion 
that the defendant acted wilfully and maliciously in the transaction. 
(2). (3) In viewing this evidence, this Court will upset the jury verdict only upon a showing by 
the appealing party that the evidence so clearly preponderates in his favor reasonable people could 
not differ on the outcome of the case.[FN10] Also, in determining if there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict this Court will consider those facts which most strongly support the verdict 
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and where there is any conflict: iti i till i EJ e idei ice tl lis Coi in I: i 'ill :oi isider as true that evidence which 
supports the verdict. [FN 11] 
FN1Q. Nelson v. Watts, Utah, 563 P.2d 798, 799 (1977). 
FN11. Id. at 798. 
In the present situation the defendant failed to counter the evidence introduced by the plaintiff, which 
when considered under the above standard substantiates the jury's conclusion the defendant Sather 
acted wilfully and maliciously. That aspect of the verdict is supported by the evidence and will not be 
overturned by this Court. 
The same standard of review applies to the second issue ii ivolving the amount the jury determined 
Ute-Cal owed Sather as guarantor of the loan. 
B 
(4) At the trial, the plaintiff alleged the renewal of the original loan was motivated by Sather's 
financial dilemmas and his request for a $25,000 loan. Concurrent with the distribution of the 
proceeds of the loan Ute-Cal issued to Sather a check for $25,000. Since $20,000 of the proceeds 
went to renew the prior debt, the $25,000 given Sather represented in essence the remainder of 
additional money that Ute-Cal received under the loan.[FN12] Although Sather contends the 
$25,000 payment was for repayment of prior debts between the two, he admittedly used the $25 000 
to purchase Savings Certificate No. 19479. This certificate which was received by the bank as 
additional collateral for the $50,000 loan was eventually cashed by Sather and the proceeds applied 
to repay the loan. 
FN12. Ute-Cal paid the first installment on the loan with the remaining $5,000 received 
from the disbursement of the proceeds of the loan, 
As the trial judge pointed out, the final sum determined by the j i n y to be owing from Ute-Cal to 
Sather is the amount Sather paid the bank as guarantor of the loan minus the $25,000 delivered 
from Ute-Cal to Sather upon the disbursement of the loan proceeds. The second loan was for the 
benefit of Sather, and the $25,000 from the savings certificate which Sather used to '*1246 
(Cite as: 605 P.2d 1240, *1246) 
repay Ute-Cal's indebtedness came directly from the proceeds of the loan. The amount awarded has 
a legitimate basis in the evidence presented and we uphold the jury's determination. 
H 
(5). We turn next to the trial court's denial of Sather's motion requesting the accrual of interest 
upon the jury's award. Rule 49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
a. Special Verdicts . . . The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning 
the matter thus submitted (as written interrogatories) as may be necessary to enable the jury to 
make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the 
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the issues so omitted 
unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without 
such demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a 
finding in accord with the judgment of the special verdict. 
Although the issue of interest was ostensibly raised by the pleadings the defendant did not voice his 
claim until after the jury was dismissed. Under Rule 49(a) the defendant, therefore, waived the jury's 
consideration of this specific issue and instead presented it to the trial court for final determination. 
a 
£6) The trial court found the jury had considered the issue of interest in its deliberation and its 
award in fact incorporated an interest payment. [FN13] Because of this conclusion the trial court did 
not supplement the jury's award and denied the defendant's motion, 
FN13, Specifically, on the question of adding interest to the jury award the trial court 
concluded: ". . . the court after reviewing the evidence and the case authority submitted 
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by counsel finds that the jury included interest in the amount found to be due to 
defendant Sather. The jury was in deliberation for nearly nine hours. After returning the 
verdict the jury went back into deliberation to answer two further questions which was 
done. No further objectives or requests were made by counsel, whereupon the jury was 
dismissed. The amount the jury found to be due to defendant Sather was $21,500, 
which is a portion of $46,560, the amount the defendant Sather paid to the defendant 
First Security Bank. The jury apparently deducted there from $25,000 which defendant 
Sather received from the original loan. The $46,560 included interest thereupon, the 
$21,500 found to be owing the defendant Sather. I t also included a portion of the 
interest included in the $46,560. . . . The court is persuaded that it may under 
circumstances cited in the Mourikas case (Mourikas v. Vardianos, 169_F.2d___53 (4 Cir. 
1948)) so act (to grant interest), however, it is the opinion of the court that under the 
facts, evidence and circumstances at hand, the jury included interest in the award made 
to the defendant Sather, thus excepting the case at hand from one that would be a 
proper subject for such relief. Accordingly, defendant Sather's Motion to add interest is 
denied." 
Rule 49(a) grants to the trial court discretion in considering issues raised by the pleadings but not 
directly addressed by the jury under a special verdict. In the present case the court employed this 
power and rendered a decision. This decision was based on a consideration of the deliberative process 
of the jury, the nature of the jury award and the jury's responses to the special interrogatories. 
The general rule which this Court follows is the judgment of the trial court will not be reversed unless 
it is shown the discretion exercised has been abused.[FN14] In arriving at his conclusion the trial 
judge considered several factors relevant to the amount and composition of the jury award. The trial 
court's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and, therefore, this Court will not alter it. 
FN14. Pauly v..McCarthy,_109 Utah 431,_184 P.2d 123_(1947J. 
Finally we turn to the plaintiff's cross-appeal of the jury's denial of any monetary damages for the 
delivery of the Warranty Deed. After instructing the jury on the applicable law concerning the issue of 
damages, the court submitted, in the special verdict form, Question No. 4 which asked: 
After subtracting any monies due Mr. Sather from Ute-Cal Land Development *1247 
- — (Cite as: 605 P.2d 1240, *1247) 
corporation, what money damages, if any, did Ute-Cal Land Development sustain as a direct result 
of the delivery of the Warranty Deed to Mr. Sather? 
The jury responded that Ute-Cal sustained no damages and in answering question 5(b) reiterated 
this finding. When the jury returned the verdict the plaintiff objected to the ambiguity of its answer to 
Question 12, concerning the amount the plaintiff was required to tender in order to regain possession 
of the Moss Ranch, but did not object to the form of and answers to the above questions. 
Rather than objecting to this decision when the jury returned the verdict, the plaintiff filed a motion 
following the dismissal of the jury requesting a new trial. In support of this motion the plaintiff argues 
that this case falls within the reach of Rule 59(a)(6) which provides: 
(a) . . . a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any 
of the following causes; . . . 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law. 
The plaintiff contends specifically evidence introduced at trial concerning mineral rent payments which 
the defendant received while in possession of the property renders the jury's answer to the above 
questions inconsistent with the evidence and against the law. 
The defendant counters this by arguing the plaintiff waived any objection to the jury's determination 
by not objecting to the answers when they were originally returned. 
(7) It is the rule in Utah that a failure to object to a verdict, informal or insufficient on its face, 
before the jury is discharged, constitutes a waiver of that objection.[FN 15] This standard is based in 
part on Rule 47(r), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: 
FN15. Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, Utah, 576 P.2d 847, 850 (1978) (Maughan, dissent). 
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If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of 
the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
The essence of the rule was explained in Cohn v. J. C. Penney, Inc.: [FN16] 
FN16. Cohn v. 3. C. Penney Company, Inc., Utah, 537 P.2d 306, 311 (1975) (Quoting 
from Brown v. Regan, 10 Cal.2d 519, 75 P.2d 1063 f 1938)). 
. . . The proper procedure when an informal or insufficient verdict has been returned is for the trial 
court to require the jury to return for further deliberation . . . . I t is well established by numerous 
authorities that, when a verdict is not in the proper form and the jury is not required to clarify it, any 
error in said verdict is waived by the party relying thereon who at the time of its rendition failed to 
make any request that its informality or uncertainty be corrected. 
The present case is very similar to Langton v. International Transport [FN17] in which the plaintiff 
was injured as a result of a collision involving the defendant's truck. The plaintiff's case was 
predicated on the defendant's negligence in stopping and parking the truck on the highway. Along 
with the damage to his vehicle and his medical expenses, the plaintiff lost 221/2 day's work as a 
result of his injuries. However, even though the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant, it assessed damages as follows: General Damages: None; Special Damages: 
$868.25; Property Damages: $600.00; Total: $1,468.25. 
FN17. Langton v. International Transport, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211 (1971). 
In considering the defendant's claim, viz., the plaintiff's failure to object to the jury verdict at the time 
it was announced precluded his protest on appeal, this Court explained: 
In the instant case, it must be conceded that if the plaintiff were entitled to an award of special 
damages, he was entitled *1248 
(Cite as: 605 P.2d 1240, *1248) 
to be compensated, under the evidence for pain and suffering and a loss of 221/2 days wages, 
irrespective of prospective damages, which the jury and trial court evidently doubted. Obviously, the 
jury failed to consider these items of damage. The verdict was defective in form in that it did not 
comprehend all the items of damages contained in the instructions given by the court, it was 
therefore insufficient. 
If counsel be permitted to remain mute when a verdict is insufficient or informal, he gains an unfair 
strategic advantage (and since) there must be reasonable rules to control the termination of 
litigation, if counsel has an opportunity to correct error at the time of its occurrence and he fails to do 
so, any objection based thereupon is waived.[FN18] 
FN18. Id. , 491P.2d at 1214. 
B 
(8) In the present case the plaintiff alleges the verdict is insufficient as to damages suffered as a 
result of the delivery of the Warranty Deed. The plaintiff was under a responsibility to object to this 
patent insufficiency at the time the verdict was rendered. Since the plaintiff did not avail himself of 
the opportunity to object to the verdict before the jury was dismissed, any later objection to its 
insufficiency is waived.[FN 19J 
FN19. The plaintiff could realize definite advantage in the present case because of the 
complexity of the factual issues involved, the duration of the trial and the vast volume of 
evidence presented. The instructions given to the jury by the court apprised them of the 
applicable law governing the recovery of damages in this action. In those instructions the 
jury was told that in determining the liability of the defendant Sather the jury was to 
consider the possibility of mitigation of damages by Ute-Cal's tender of the monies 
expended by Sather as guarantor of the loan. They were also instructed on the 
restrictions to awarding speculative damages and the plaintiff admitted the exact amount 
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received as rents could not be calculated. The plaintiff had ample opportunity to present 
evidence concerning the damages suffered during the trial and no injustice is rendered by 
denying the plaintiff an opportunity to "try again" with a new jury. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
Copr. (C) West 2006 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works Utah, 1980. 
Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather 
605 P.2d 1240 
END OF DOCUMENT 
(C) 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(Cite as: 590 P.2d 1244) 
590 P.2d 1244 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
HIDDEN MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Dee MILLS, Milton C. Christensen, aka Milton A. Christensen, Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., Lake 
Mills Company, a Limited Partnership, Carole Lee Christensen, Environmental Resources, Inc., et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Nos. 15027, 15157, and 15188. 
Jan. 2, 1979. 
Plaintiff filed action in equity seeking specific performance of an option to purchase realty. The Fourth 
District Court, Wasatch County, D. Frank Wilkins, J., dismissed action and plaintiff appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Ellett, J., 29JJtah 2d__469, 511 P.2d 737, reversed and directed granting of specific 
performance. On remand, the trial court ordered defendant to transfer property to plaintiff. When 
plaintiff was unable to enforce judgment against defendant due to interim conveyances, plaintiff filed 
supplemental complaint and joined as additional party defendants those persons who acquired 
interests in subject land subsequent to entry of initial judgment of trial court. The Fourth District 
Court, Wasatch County, Ernest F. Baldwin, J., entered judgment of specific performance in favor of 
plaintiff, subject to defendant's entitlement to compensation for improvement made as an occupying 
claimant, and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) lis pendens continued 
to be effective after judgment and pending appeal, and thus defendants were thereby charged with 
constructive notice of plaintiffs claims prior to their acquisition of any interests in land; (2) record 
also supported trial court's conclusion that defendants had actual notice of plaintiff's appeal; (3) trial 
court's determination, in proceeding following remand, ordering specific performance was res judicata 
as to amount payable by plaintiff under option to defendant, and defendant could not now attempt to 
alter that determination so as to recover value of improvements made as occupying claimant after 
date of plaintiff's option, and (4) occupying claimant having made no showing that it acted in good 
faith in making improvements on subject property, it was not entitled to compensation for said 
improvements. 
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
Crockett, J., concurred but dissented in part and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
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[1] KeyCite Notes ^ 
t^242 Lis Pendens 
c^242k6 Commencement and Pendency of Action 
c^242k l l Termination of Action 
^ 242k l l (2 ) k. As Affected by Proceedings for Review or Vacation of Judgment. Most Cited 
Cases 
Lis pendens continued to be effective after judgment and pending appeal. U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2. 
H 
[2] KeyCite Notes ^ 
v~~'Z42 Lis Pendens 
c^242kl k. Nature and Grounds in General. Most Cited Cases 
Term "lis pendens" signifies pending litigation and so-called "doctrine of lis pendens" confirms power 
of courts over property during pendency of legal proceedings. U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2. 
[3] KeyCite Notes 
c-242 Lis Pendens 
Q242k22 Operation and Effect in General 
C^242k22(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
"Lis pendens" charges public with notice of outstanding claims and causes one who deals with 
property involved in pending litigation to do so at his peril. U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2. 
[41 KeyCite Notes 
o 2 4 2 Lis Pendens 
0^242kl k. Nature and Grounds in General. Most Cited Cases 
Sole purpose of recording a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of pendency of proceedings 
which may be derogatory to an owner's title or right to possession. U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2. 
[5] KeyCite Notes 
c^-242 Lis Pendens 
o-242_k22 Operation and Effect in General 
c^242k22(2) k. Extent of Notice. Most Cited Cases 
One who takes with full knowledge that property taken is subject of ongoing litigation acquires only 
grantor's interest therein, subject to whatever disposition court might make of it. 
[61 KeyCite Notes ^ 
€-30 Appeal and Error 
C-30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause 
o^30XVH(F) Mandate and Proceedings in Lower Court 
c ^30k l l 96 Powers and Duties of Lower Court 
o^30k 1197 k. Jurisdiction of Lower Court After Remand. Most Cited Cases 
Where a judgment is reversed and remanded with specific instruction or directions, case stands in 
lower court precisely as it did before a trial was had in the first instance. 
|KC. 
[71 KeyCite Notes 
c^242 Lis Pendens 
Q242k6 Commencement and Pendency of Action 
o*242k 11 Termination of Action 
c -242k l l ( 2 ) k. As Affected by Proceedings for Review or Vacation of Judgment. Most Cited 
Cases 
Fact that plaintiff failed to furnish a supersedeas bond after filing an appeal from trial court's dismissal 
of its action for specific performance of an option to purchase realty did not render notice given by 
previously recorded lis pendens ineffectual. U.C.A.1953, 78-40-2; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 73(d). 
[8] KeyCite Notes 
€^326 Records 
c^326I In General 
<^326kl9 k. Construction and Operation in General. Most Cited Cases 
Those who deal in real property interests are bound by those matters that appear of record and one 
may not be penalized or deprived of effectiveness of such notice as is imparted by record simply 
because of some unrelated action or inaction of his or others. 
m 
[91 KeyCite Notes U J 
<K30 Appeal and Error 
C-3QIX Supersedeas or Stay of Proceedings 
<^30k458 Right to Supersedeas or Stay in General 
€<30k458(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Plaintiff, which appealed trial court's dismissal of its action for specific performance of an option to 
purchase realty, was not bound to furnish supersedeas; such was merely available to him. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rule 73(d). 
S [10] KeyCite Notes 
Q-30 Appeal and Error 
c^30IX Supersedeas or Stay of Proceedings 
<^30k484 Scope and Effect as Stay 
O30k485 Proceeding in Cause in General 
<^30k485(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Purpose and effect of supersedeas is to restrain successful party and lower court from taking 
affirmative action to enforce a judgment or decree. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 73(d}. 
[11] KeyCite Notes ^ 
0^242 Lis Pendens 
c^242k6 Commencement and Pendency of Action 
€^>242kll Termination of Action 
c-- 242k l l (2 ) k. As Affected by Proceedings for Review or Vacation of Judgment. Most Cited 
Cases 
Since lis pendens filed in connection with suit for specific performance of an option to purchase realty 
was still effective after judgment and pending appeal, parties which subsequently acquired interest in 
subject land subsequent to entry of initial judgment of trial court were thereby charged with 
constructive notice of plaintiffs claim prior to their acquisition of any interest in land. U.C.A.1953, 78-
40-2. 
[12] KeyCite Notes 
€--30 Appeal and Error 
C-30XVH Determination and Disposition of Cause 
c^30XVII(F) Mandate and Proceedings in Lower Court 
o*30k 1209 New Trial 
O30k l214 k. Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
Record supported trial court's conclusion, on supplemental complaint following remand, that 
defendants had actual knowledge of plaintiffs appeal from trial court's original dismissal of its action 
for specific performance of an option to purchase realty and hence defendants, which acquired 
interests in subject land subsequent to entry of initial judgment of trial court, were charged with 
knowledge of fact that first judgment was subject to being reversed. 
m 
[13] KeyCite Notes ^ 
€^228 Judgment 
Q228XIH Merger and Bar of Causes of Action and Defenses 
Q228XHKB) Causes of Action and Defenses Merged, Barred, or Concluded 
c^228k586 Identity of Subject-Matter 
Q228k586(2) k. What Constitutes. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's determination, in proceeding following remand, ordering specific performance of option to 
purchase realty in favor of plaintiff was res judicata as to amount payable by plaintiff under option to 
defendant, and defendant could not subsequently attempt to alter that determination so as to recover 
value of improvements made as occupying claimant after date of plaintiffs option. U.C.A.1953, 57-6-
1 et seq. 
|K 
[14] KeyCite Notes 
0^206 Improvements 
€^206k3 k. Ownership. Most Cited Cases 
"Occupying Claimants" statute ameliorates strict common-law rule that owner is entitled to 
improvements placed by another upon his property, and is based upon equitable doctrine of unjust 
enrichment. U.C.A.1953, 57-6-1 et seq., 57-6-2. 
[15] KeyCite Notes ^ 
€^206 Improvements 
o*206k4 Compensation 
c^206k4(I) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
An occupying claimant is required by statute to establish two elements before he can recover for 
improvements placed on real property by him: (1) that he has color of title; and (2) that he placed 
improvements in good faith; if he fails to establish either one, he cannot recover. U.C.A.1953, 57-6-1 
et seq. 
[16] KeyCite Notes 
€-30 Appeal and Error 
O30XVI Review 
o30XVI ( I ) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and Findings 
<^30XVIQ)3 Findings of Court 
O^30kl008 Conclusiveness in General 
^ 3 0 k l 0 0 8 . 1 In General 
<--30kl008__.l(3) k. Substituting Reviewing Court's Judgment. Most Cited Cases 
Rules of appellate review generally preclude the Supreme Court from substituting its judgment for 
that of trial court on factual issues. 
£17J KeyCite„Notes_ 
c^>388 Trial 
C-388X Trial by Court 
c^388X(B) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
C^388k388 Duty to Make in General 
<^388k388(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Trial court is bound to make factual determinations to support its legal conclusions and said findings 
must be supported by substantial evidence. 
[18] KeyCite Notes„ 
v^206 Improvements 
€^206k4 Compensation 
C^206k4(2) k. Good Faith of Claimant. Most Cited Cases 
Occupying claimant having made no showing that it acted in good faith in making improvements on 
subject property, it was not entitled to compensation for said improvements. U.C.A.1953, 57-6-1 et 
seq. 
|» 
£19] KeyCite Notes 
^-206 Improvements 
206k4 Compensation 
o-206k4(2) k. Good Faith of Claimant. Most Cited Cases 
One who relies upon rights afforded by statute as an occupying claimant is charged with burden of 
demonstrating his good faith in placing improvements in face of an adverse claim. U.C.A.1953, 57-6-
1 et seq. 
IKC, 
[20] KeyCite Notes 
i-2_06 Improvements 
€^206k4 Compensation 
<--206k4(2) k. Good Faith of Claimant. Most Cited Cases 
Occupying claimant's reliance on accuracy of trial court's initial ruling dismissing action for specific 
performance of an option to purchase realty was not sufficient to justify a determination of good faith 
on part of occupying claimant in placing improvements in face of an adverse claim on subject 
property. U.C.A.1953, 57-6-1 et seq. 
*1246 
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John G. Marshall, Salt Lake City, for Dee Mills, Evelyn I. Mills, and Evelyn Mills Trust. 
Hanson & Garrett, Salt Lake City, for Intern. Environ. Sciences. 
Leonard H. Russon and James L. Sadler, Salt Lake City, for Milton Christensen, Paradise Valley 
Estates, Lake Mills, Carole Christensen and Environmental Resources. 
Cullen Y. Christensen, Provo, for plaintiff and respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
This is an action in equity seeking specific performance of an option to purchase realty. 
Defendants, Dee Mills and Evelyn I. Mills (hereinafter "Mills"), granted the option in question in 
favor of plaintiffs predecessor in interest. Subsequently, Mills granted a similar option to defendant, 
Milton C. Christensen (hereinafter "Christensen"). Mills refused to honor plaintiffs option which 
resulted in the filing of the initial complaint and the recording of a Lis Pendens in the office of the 
county recorder. Thereafter, Mills conveyed various interests in the land in question to defendants, 
Paradise Valley Estates, Inc., (hereinafter "Paradise") Lake Hills Company, a limited partnership, 
(hereinafter "Lake") Carole Lee Davis, Environmental Resources, Inc., and International 
Environmental Sciences, a limited partnership (hereinafter "International"). Those conveyances were 
apparently with the consent of Christensen as he was president of Paradise, the principal of Lake and 
became the husband of Carole Lee Davis (a partner in International). 
The initial trial of the specific performance action resulted in a judgment of dismissal declaring the 
option void and an appeal was filed to this Court. Supersedeas bond was fixed in the sum of $50,000, 
however, none was ever furnished. This Court reversed and directed the granting of specific 
performance of the option.[FN1] On remand, the trial court on August 28, 1973 ordered Mills to 
transfer the property to plaintiff for the sum of $86,200. In the interim between the entry of the initial 
judgment and the order of August 28, 1973, Lake and Paradise conveyed the land in question to 
defendant, International, which proceeded to make certain improvements on the land and also made 
certain conveyances of various portions thereof. When plaintiff was unable to enforce the judgment 
against Mills due to the interim conveyances, it filed a supplemental complaint and joined as 
additional parties defendant those persons who had acquired any interest in the subject land 
subsequent to the entry of the initial judgment of the trial court. 
FN1. Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, et.al., 29 Utah_2_d 4_69, 511 
P.2d 737 Q973). 
After a trial on the issues raised by the supplemental complaint, the trial court specifically found that 
all defendants had actual knowledge of the appeal pending in this Court prior to their acquisition of 
any purported interest in the land and, since the Lis *1247 
(Cite as: 590 P.2d 1244, *1247) 
Pendens remained unreleased, they had constructive notice of plaintiffs interest as well. The trial 
court further found that International had made improvements upon the land consisting of land 
leveling and clearing, installation of culverts, grading of roads, installation of ditches and remodeling 
and addition to a house situated thereon, all of which had a value of $35,000. The trial court also 
found that International had undertaken certain planning, platting and rezoning activities with respect 
to the use of the land, but declined to place any value thereon as an improvement. Accordingly, 
judgment of specific performance was entered in favor of plaintiff, subject to International's 
entitlement to compensation in the amount of $35,000 for improvement made as an occupying 
claimant.[FN2] 
FN2. Pursuant to LLC.A., 1953, 57-6-1, et seq. 
Mills, Christensen and International filed separate appeals which have been previously consolidated. 
[FN3] The basic issue raised by each appeal bears upon the propriety of the trial court's 
determination that the recordation of a Lis Pendens precludes the conveyance of a marketable title to 
lands that are the subject of a pending appeal. Both International and Mills raise additional issues 
which bear upon their respective positions as occupying claimants, the former contending it is entitled 
to a further award for expenditures attributable to its efforts to rezone the land, and the latter 
contending that the trial court erred in refusing to receive proffered evidence of improvements they 
made to the land. 
FN3„. Various other named defendants' interests were previously compromised and settled 
so as to obviate their appeal. Also, the appeal of Paradise, Lake, Carole Lee Christensen 
(formerly Carole Lee Davis), and Environmental Resources will hereafter be referred to 
that of "Christensen" for the purposes of convenience since the issues raised are 
identical. 
Plaintiff cross-appeals, challenging the award to International as an occupying claimant on the ground 
that the improvements were not made in good faith. 
m 
[1] First addressing the Lis Pendens issue, we note that appellants simply urge that Lis Pendens 
has no effect or duration after judgment and pending appeal. A review of the basic doctrine of Lis 
Pendens, our statutory enactment pertaining thereto, and the prior pronouncements of this Court, fail 
to sustain their contentions. 
£21 £31 Literally, the term "lis pendens" signifies pending litigation and the so-called "doctrine 
of lis pendens" confirms the power of the courts over property during the pendency of legal 
proceedings. It charges the public with notice of outstanding claims and causes one who deals with 
property involved in pending litigation to do so at his peril.[FN4] 
FN4. See 51 Am.Jur.2d Lis Pendens, Sec. 1. 
U._CA., 1953^78-40-2 provides as follows: 
78-40-2. Lis pendens. In any action effecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property 
the plaintiff At the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the defendant At the time of filing his 
answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, Or at any time afterward, may file for 
record with the recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice 
of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or 
defense, and a description of the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing 
such notice for record only shall a purchaser encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be 
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against 
parties designated by their real names. (Emphasis added.) 
The fact that the foregoing statutory provision allows the recordation of a Lis Pendens At any time 
clearly preserves its integrity After judgment and pending appeal. 
Consistent with said statutory provision, this Court long ago recognized the on-going potency and 
effectiveness of a recorded lis pendens after judgment. In Larsen v. Gasberg *1248 
(Cite as : 590 P.2d 1244, *1248) 
[FN5] it was held that where real property was levied upon under an execution as the property of the 
judgment debtor, the filing of a lis pendens notice of a suit by the grantor of the judgment debtor One 
day before the execution sale imparted notice to the purchaser at such execution sale of all plaintiffs 
right, title and interest. Consequently, the deed executed under such circumstances was held to be 
null and void and was cancelled for want of a bona fide or innocent purchaser. 
FN5.43 Utah 203, 134 P. 885 (1913). 
[4] [5] The sole purpose of recording a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of the 
pendency of proceedings which may be derogatory to an owner's title or right to possession.[FN6] 
One who takes with full knowledge that the property taken is the subject of on-going litigation 
acquires only the grantor's interest therein, subject to whatever disposition the court might make of 
it. [FN7] 
FN6. Hansen v. Kohler^ Utah, 550 P.2d 186 (1976). 
FN7. Glynn v, Dubm, 13 Utah_2d 16.3, 369„P,2d 930 (12.6_2}. 
£6] The rule is well settled that, where a judgment is reversed and remanded with specific 
instruction or directions, the case stands in the lower court precisely as it did before a trial was had in 
the first instance.[FN8] Hence, that very situation existed in the instant case as a result of our 
reversal and remand with directions to grant specific performance.[FN9] Also, by so reversing, the 
Court has already recognized the full effectiveness of lis pendens pending appeal. 
FN8. Larsen v. Gasberg, supra, footnote 5. 
FN9. Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, supra, footnote 1. 
Ea ra ea Ea 
£7] [8] [9] [10] Appellants further contend that since plaintiff failed to furnish a 
supersedeas bond it was not entitled to a stay of proceedings and that such failure in some way 
rendered the notice given by the recorded lis pendens ineffectual. For two very obvious reasons, that 
contention is without merit. First, and foremost, the "failure" to accomplish any number of imaginable 
things in no way alters the inescapable fact that a duly recorded lis pendens serves as notice to all 
persons. It is an elementary principle of real estate law that those who deal in property interests are 
bound by those matters that appear of record and one may not be penalized or deprived of the 
effectiveness of such notice as is imparted by the record simply because of some unrelated action or 
inaction of his or others. Secondly, plaintiff was not bound to furnish supersedeas. Such was merely 
Available to him.[FN10] The fact that none was furnished is of no consequence in this case. This is 
found to be so when it is observed that the purpose and effect of supersedeas is to restrain the 
successful party and the lower court from taking affirmative action to enforce a judgment or decree. 
[FN11] The judgment involved here was one of dismissal and, as such, was self-executing. Hence, it 
was not the subject of any enforcement and the failure to perfect supersedeas could in no way affect 
it.[FN12] 
FN 10. Rule„73(d), Utah_Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FN11. 4 Am Jur.2d Appeal and Error, Section 371. 
FN12. Gumberts v. East Oak Street Hotel Co., 404 III. 386, 88 N.E.2d 883 (1949); 
Western United Dairy Co. v. Miller, 40 III.App.2d 403. 189 N.E.2d 786 (1963). 
[11] In light of the foregoing analysis, it cannot be said that a lis pendens does not endure after 
judgment and pending appeal, and we so hold. Consequently, the trial court correctly determined that 
all appellants were thereby charged with constructive notice of plaintiffs claims prior to their 
acquisition of any interests in the land in question. 
[12] The propriety of the trial court's conclusion that appellants had Actual notice of plaintiff's 
appeal is also borne out by the record which reflects the fact that at all times material to these 
proceedings, Christensen was intertwined with all of the appellants and was the apparent alter ego of 
certain of them. He was president of Paradise*1249 
(Cite as: 590 P.2d 1244, *1249) 
and Environmental Resources, Inc. which was the general partner of Environmental, a limited 
partnership, and he married Carole Lee Davis on February 16, 1973. Those facts are sufficient to 
support the trial court's conclusion that the appellants had actual knowledge of plaintiff's appeal and 
hence were charged with knowledge of the fact that the first judgment was subject to being reversed. 
[FN13], 
FN13. McClung v. Hohl, 10 Kan.App. 93, 61 P. 507 (1900); Patterson v. Old Dominion 
Trust Co., 149 Va. 597, 140 S.E. 810 (1927); Glynn v. Dubin, supra, footnote 7. 
B 
[13] Turning now to the issue presented by the appeal of Mills which bears upon their 
entitlement to the value of improvements made as occupying claimants after the date of plaintiffs 
option to purchase, it appears that their contentions are without substance. This is so by reason of 
the fact that these matters were before the trial court in the proceeding conducted following our 
earlier remand. In that proceeding, plaintiff and Mills were both parties, the same property was 
involved, and the amount to be paid by plaintiff to Mills to acquire the property was determined. No 
appeal was taken from the order of Specific Performance of August 28, 1973. Such prior 
determination is res judicata as to the amount payable by the plaintiff under the option to Mills, who 
cannot now attempt to alter that former decision.[FN14] 
FN14. Matthews v. Matthews, 102 Utah 428, 132 P.2d 111 (1942). 
The final issue requiring our attention involves the appeal of International which seeks to enhance its 
award for improvements as occupying claimant and the cross-appeal of plaintiff which asserts the trial 
court erred in making any award at all for improvements. 
The Legislature has seen fit to temper the rigid rules of the common law by enacting an "Occupying 
Claimants" statute [FN 15] which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
FN15. U.C.A., 1953, 57.-6-1, et seq. 
57-6-1. Where an occupant of real estate has color of title thereto, And in good faith has made 
valuable improvements thereon, and is afterwards in a proper action found not to be the owner, no 
execution shall issue to put the plaintiff in possession of the same after the filing of a complaint as 
hereinafter provided, until the provisions of this chapter have been complied with. (Emphasis added.) 
57-6-2. Such complaint must set forth the grounds on which the defendant seeks relief, stating as 
accurately as practicable the value of the real estate, exclusive of the improvements thereon made by 
the claimant or his grantors, and the value of such improvements. The issues joined thereon must be 
tried as in law actions, and the value of the real estate and of such improvements must be separately 
ascertained on the trial. 
H 
£14] The foregoing sections ameliorate the strict common law rule that the owner is entitled to 
the improvements placed by another upon his property, and is based upon the equitable doctrine of 
unjust enrichment.[FN 16] 
JFN16. Reimann v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387X1949). 
a 
[15] An occupying claimant is required by our statute to establish two elements before he can 
recover for improvements placed on real property by him: (1) that he has color of title; and (2) that 
he placed the improvements in good faith. If he fails to establish either one, he cannot recover. 
[FN171 
FN17. Doyle v. West Temple Terrace Co., 47 Utah 238, 152 P. 1180 (1915); Day v. 
Jones,. 112.Utah.286, 187_ P.2d__181_( 1.947). 
A number of jurisdictions, including Utah, have announced the broad proposition that no recovery can 
be had for improvements made with the knowledge of the existence of an adverse claim which 
subsequently proves to be superior to that of the occupant.£FN18J The cases of *1250 
(Cite as: 590 P.2d 1244, *1250) 
Reimann v. Baum [FN 19] and Erickson v. Stokes [FN201 both stand for the proposition that one who 
places improvements after notice of an adverse claim is precluded from recovering the value thereof. 
FNJL8. See 41 Am Jur.2d, Improvements, Section 17 for citations. 
FN 19^ Supra, footnote 16. 
FN20, 120JJ_tah 653, 237 P2_2d_1012 (1951). 
The facts in Erickson v. Stokes are strikingly similar to those in the case before us. There, Erickson, a 
purchaser at tax sale, sued to quiet title and obtained a judgment. Thereafter, Stokes sought to 
intervene and moved to set aside the decree and re-open the case, setting forth by affidavit that she 
had a substantial interest in the property and a good defense to the action. Her application for 
intervention was denied and she then sued Erickson to quiet title, recording a lis pendens. She was 
ultimately successful in her suit, having shown the tax sale was defective. After the filing of her quiet 
title action and during its pendency, Erickson proceeded to construct improvements. The court in 
denying Erickson's claim for the value of the improvements observed that he had notice of the 
adverse claim prior to the placement of the improvements and in the absence of a showing of good 
faith, (which burden was upon him) he could not recover. 
iff J lurl 
[16] [17] The rules of appellate review generally preclude this Court from substituting its 
judgment for that of the trial court on factual issues. However, the trial court is bound to make factual 
determinations to support its legal conclusions and said findings must be supported by substantial 
evidence. 
ig 
[18] A review of the record in this matter reveals that International made no showing that it 
acted in good faith in making the improvements and the court's findings of fact are entirely silent in 
that regard, leaving nothing to support its conclusion of law that International was entitled to an 
award of $35,000. 
It is also to be noted that the conclusion of the trial court that International had Actual and 
Constructive notice of plaintiffs claims is wholly inconsistent with the concept of good faith on the 
part of International. 
[19] As was noted supra, the doctrine of lis pendens imposes upon one who deals in property, 
which is the subject of pending litigation, the burden of doing so at his peril. Consequently, one who 
relies upon the rights afforded by statute as an occupying claimant is charged with the burden of 
demonstrating his good faith in placing improvements in the face of an adverse claim. 
IS. 
£201 International's sole explanation of good faith was that it relied on the accuracy of the ruling 
in the first trial under the facts of this case. Such is not sufficient to justify a determination of good 
faith. 
The judgment is affirmed except that portion thereof which awards $35,000 to International as an 
occupying claimant is vacated. Plaintiff is entitled to costs. 
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and WILKINS, 33., concur. 
CROCKETT, Justice: (Concurring, but dissenting in part). 
I agree with all that is said in the main opinion, except that I dissent from those portions dealing with 
the reversal of the award of $35,000 to the defendant as an occupying claimant. That reversal 
appears to be based upon the statement that "no recovery can be had for improvements made with 
the knowledge of the existence of an adverse claim which subsequently proves to be superior to that 
of the occupant." That statement is too broad. If literally applied, it would in many instances defeat 
the purpose of the occupying claimant statute. It is submitted that an examination of the cases cited 
in support thereof £FN1] will reveal that the rule as stated is all right as applicable to the particular 
facts therein, but is not necessarily inconsistent with what is said in this dissent. 
FN1. See footnote 18 main opinion. 
I t requires little reflection to realize that if a claimant must have title which ult imately*1251 
(Cite as: 590 P.2d 1244, *1251) 
proves to be superior, he would have no need to recover for improvements placed on the land. I t is 
only when he has a bona fide claim, constituting color of title, and in good faith places improvements 
on the land, and his claim of title later proves to be inferior to some other claim, that he needs that 
protection. 
Consistent with the foregoing is the language of the statutes themselves. Secs.__57-6-l and 2 indicate 
that the occupant can recover if "in good faith" he makes valuable improvements on the property and 
is afterwards "Found not to be the owner." It is obvious that this contemplates a situation where 
there is an outstanding "adverse claim which subsequently proves to be superior to that of the 
occupant." 
The main opinion correctly states that the doctrine is based on unjust enrichment of the person who 
proves to be the true owner. This enrichment entails something which is a benefit to the land and 
thus to the true owner. 
Whether recovery may be had may well depend upon several circumstances, including the nature of 
the improvement placed on the property. Conceivably it could be a dam, or a bridge or some other 
improvement essential to preserve the land itself, as contrasted with something which would improve 
it only for the purpose and use of the occupying claimant. In this case the view of the trial court was 
that the leveling and clearing of the land, installation of ditches and culverts, grading of roads and 
remodeling of the house were such improvements of the land itself as to constitute an unjust 
enrichment to the plaintiff. 
The critical questions for determination in this case: whether the defendant as an occupying claimant 
placed the improvements thereon in good faith, and whether they unjustly enriched the plaintiff by 
improving his land, are necessarily questions of fact the determination of which should be left to the 
trial court. This is affirmed by Sec. 57-6-2 which states that "the issues joined thereon must be tried 
as in law actions . . . ." 
Inasmuch as those critical issues have been tried and determined by the trial court, and there is a 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support his finding and judgment, it is my opinion that under the 
standard rule of review they should not be overturned. 
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
Copr. (C) West 2006 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works Utah, 1978. 
Hidden Meadows Development Co. v. Mills 
590 P.2d 1244 
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ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This case involves a dispute over the occupancy of land between twenty-one individuals ("the 
claimants") and the United Effort Plan Trust ("the UEP"). The claimants built improvements on land 
located in Hildale, Utah, and Colorado City, Arizona, which they occupy but which is owned by the 
UEP. Claimants filed an action in Washington County, Utah, to determine their rights in the UEP land 
they occupy. 
Claimants asserted ten causes of action: for relief under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, for breach 
of express contract, breach of implied contract, negligent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, estoppel, 
unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, accounting, and distribution of trust. The trial court 
separated the first seven claims relating to the claimants' property rights for trial, holding in abeyance 
the three trust-based issues. After trial, the court relied on an unjust enrichment theory to hold that the 
claimants were entitled to occupy the UEP land during their lifetimes or to receive compensation for the 
improvements they made. The court imposed a constructive trust in favor of the claimants. The trial 
court denied relief on the three trust-based claims because it concluded that the UEP was a charitable 
and not a private trust. 
Each party appealed. The UEP argues that (i) the trial court erred in awarding claimants a continuing 
interest in the land on an unjust enrichment theory and (ii) giving the claimants a continuing interest in 
the land infringes on the remaining UEP members' free exercise of religion and therefore violates the 
Utah and United States Constitutions. On their cross appeal, the claimants argue that the trial court erred 
(i) by applying the wrong legal standard to their claim under Utah's Occupying Claimants Act ("the 
Act") and (ii) in finding that the UEP is a charitable trust. We reject the UEP's arguments, affirm the 
trial court's unjust enrichment ruling, reverse its conclusion that the trust is charitable, reverse its 
interpretation of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, and remand for further proceedings. Before 
proceeding to our analysis, we set forth the facts taken from the trial court's extensive findings. 
Sometime in the late nineteenth century, some members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints organized a movement called the Priesthood Work ("The Work") to continue the practice of 
plural marriage outside that church. In the early part of this century, The Work's leadership—the 
Priesthood Council—decided to settle its membership in an isolated area to avoid interference with their 
religious practices. In approximately the 1930s, The Work selected an area composed of Hildale, Utah, 
and Colorado City, Arizona—an area now known as Short Creek. The Priesthood Council secured a large 
tract of land in this area, and adherents of The Work began to settle there. 
The Work continued to secure additional land in the area. Commonly, its adherents bought land and 
deeded it to The Work. Eventually, the leadership of The Work formed a trust to hold title to the land. 
This trust failed, and, for the most part, the land was deeded back to those who contributed it. In 1942, 
the Priesthood Council signed and recorded in Mohave County, Arizona, a Declaration of Trust for the 
United Effort Plan. After the Priesthood Council formed the UEP, adherents deeded most of the land 
that had been held by the first trust to the UEP. Over the years, the UEP acquired more land as adherents 
obtained and deeded it to the trust. The UEP currently owns all the land occupied by the claimants. 
From its inception, the UEP invited members to build their homes on assigned lots on UEP land. 
Through this system, the UEP intended to localize control over all local real property and to have the 
religious leaders manage it. Members who built on the trust land were aware that they could not sell or 
mortgage the land and that they would forfeit their improvements if they left the land. However, the 
UEP did encourage its members to improve the lots assigned to them and represented to its members 
that they could live on the land permanently, by using such phrases as "forever" or "as long as you 
wanted." The leaders also told members that having a home on UEP land was better than having a deed 
because creditors could not foreclose upon the land for members' debts. 
Sometime during the late 1960's or early 1970's, dissention over a doctrinal issue arose among adherents 
of The Work, causing a split in the Priesthood Council. The dissension broke into the open in 1984 
when adherents of The Work split into two groups: one group, led by Rulon T. Jeffs ("Jeffs"), acquired 
control of the UEP. A second group, led by J. Marion Hammon and Alma Timpson, includes most of the 
claimants in the present case.^ 
In 1986, Jeffs declared that all those living on UEP land were tenants at will. Before this declaration, 
neither the UEP nor any of its representatives had told the claimants that they were tenants at will. In 
1987, the claimants filed an action in the Federal District Court for the District of Utah, asking the court 
to determine their rights in the property. The UEP, in turn, filed an unlawful detainer action and several 
quiet title actions against some of the claimants in state court in 1989 and 1993. The state court stayed 
these cases pending resolution of claimants' federal action. In 1993, the federal district court dismissed 
the federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the pendent state law claims 
without prejudice. Shortly thereafter, the claimants filed an action in Utah's district court in Washington 
County. The state court consolidated their action with the UEP's previously filed unlawful detainer 
action and several quiet title actions. 
In these consolidated actions, the claimants presented a number of claims, the most pertinent of which is 
that they are entitled to their lots under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, see Utah Code Ann. 57-6-1 
to -8, and, alternatively, that the UEP has been unjustly enriched by their improvements to the land. 
After a bench trial, the judge made findings of fact and granted claimants relief only on their unjust 
enrichment claim. It found as a matter of statutory interpretation that they were not covered by the Utah 
Occupying Claimants Act. 
On appeal, the claimants argue that the trial court erred in applying the Act. They also argue that the trial 
court erred in finding that the UEP is a charitable, not a private, trust-a finding that precluded claimants 
from prevailing on their claims related to the conduct of the trustees. For its part, the UEP asserts that 
the trial court erred in granting claimants equitable relief, primarily because application of equitable 
principles to a religious organization violates the Utah and United States Constitutions. We address each 
issue in turn. 
The standard of review for the trial court's interpretation of the Act is straightforward.® Because a 
district court's interpretation of a statute is a legal question, we review its ruling for correctness. See 
MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 630-31 (Utah 1995). On the other hand, we uphold a trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are "clearly erroneous." See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 
177, 181 (Utah 1997). Because appellant did not provide a trial transcript on appeal, we assume 
competent and substantial evidence supported the trial court's extensive factual findings. See Goodman 
v. Lee, 589 P.2d 759, 760 (Utah 1978) ("When no transcript is furnished on an appeal it is presumed that 
the evidence given was sufficient to sustain the judgement."); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 490 
P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1971) ("The appellant elected not to bring before us any of the testimony presented 
to the trial court, and so we must presume such findings as were made to be based upon competent and 
substantial evidence."). Therefore, we will not overturn the trial court's factual findings. The 
determinative issues are, then, issues of law. 
The first question is whether the trial court correctly interpreted the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. 
Section 57-6-1 of the Act provided: 
Where an occupant of real estate has color of title thereto, and in good faith has made valuable 
improvements thereon, and is afterwards in proper action found not to be the owner, no execution shall 
issue to put the plaintiff in possession of the same after the filing of a complaint as hereinafter provided, 
until the provisions of this chapter have been complied with. 
Utah Code Ann. 57-6-1 (1994) (emphasis added).^ This statute requires occupying claimants to show 
that they (i) have "color of title" and (ii) made valuable improvements (iii) in good faith. See Hidden 
Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah 1979). The district court found that the 
claimants had made valuable improvements. However, it did not determine whether claimants had color 
of title because it had first concluded that the claimants did not make the improvements in "good faith" 
as required by the statute. 
We address the preliminary question of whether the claimants had color of title before addressing the 
determination that they lacked good faith. Section 57-6-4 of the Code defines "color of title." It states: 
[A]ny person has color of title who has occupied a tract of real estate by himself, or by those under 
whom he claims, [i] for the term of five years, or [ii] who has thus occupied it for less time, if he, or 
those under whom he claims, have at any time during such occupancy with the knowledge or consent, 
express or implied, of the real owner made any valuable improvements thereon, or [iii] if he or those 
under whom he claims have at any time during such occupancy paid the ordinary county taxes thereon 
for any one year, and two years have elapsed without a repayment of the same by the owner, and the 
occupancy is continued up to the time at which the action is brought by which the recovery of the real 
estate is obtained. 
Utah Code Ann. 57-6-4 (1994) (brackets and emphasis added).^ 
Factually, categories (i) and (ii) cover all the claimants here. They either "occupied a tract of real estate . 
. . for the term of five years," or they, or those under whom they claim, have made "valuable 
improvements" to real estate "with the owner's knowledge or consent." See id. The facts found by the 
district court show that the UEP knew that all the claimants were improving the land and encouraged 
them to do so. In many cases, claimants obtained consent from The Work's leadership to improve the 
land. The claimants, therefore, have color of title. 
The next requirement under section 57-6-1 is that the claimants show that they made the improvements 
in "good faith." The trial court found that they did not. In defining the statutory term, "good faith," the 
trial court relied on case law stating that "[t]he good faith of an occupying claimant must be premised 
upon a reasonable and honest belief of ownership." Ute-Cal Land Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 645 P.2d 665, 
667 (Utah 1982). The trial court concluded that the claimants did not make the improvements in good 
faith because they had "not even claimed that they actually own the land they occupy" and because "they 
were installed upon the property of the UEP, knowingly by those who were using the land by 
permission." We conclude that the trial court erred in its interpretation of "belief of ownership." 
The trial court appears to have assumed that "ownership" means possession of a fee simple interest in 
land. But it is settled law that '"[o]wnership' is a collection of rights to possess, to use and to enjoy 
property, including the right to sell and transmit i t . . . . [T]he term owner is often used to characterize 
the possessor of an interest less than that of absolute ownership, such as . . . a tenant for life." 63C Am. 
Jur. 2d Property 26 (1997). We have no reason to think that when the Act was passed the legislature 
intended to restrict the meaning of the term "ownership" to a narrower class of interests in land than the 
general law would allow.^ We therefore conclude that a good faith belief in a life interest in land 
satisfies the good faith requirement of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. 
In the present case, the claimants acknowledged that they do not hold fee simple title. But the evidence 
before the trial court is entirely consistent with the claimants' having a good faith belief that they were 
entitled to possess the property during their lives so long as they did not abandon the property. The law 
describes such an interest as a life estate, and a life estate is an "ownership" interest. See id . ^ On this 
point, however, we must remand the matter for additional specific findings as to claimants' beliefs of a 
life estate interest. 
The claimants presented evidence that the UEP represented to them that they could occupy the land for 
their lives or for as long as they lived on the land. And the trial court concluded that these 
representations "could reasonably have created in [claimants'] mind[s] an expectation that [they] would 
be able to live out [their] days on the [UEP] land so long as [they] did not sell the land, mortgage it or 
abandon its use." But because the trial court believed the Act required a good faith belief of a fee simple 
interest, it made no specific findings as to claimants' beliefs that they possessed a life estate interest. 
Absent such a belief, good faith would be lacking. If an appellate court determines that findings of fact 
are insufficient to support a necessary legal conclusion, the appellate court will normally remand the 
matter for further proceedings. See Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997). While we think the 
trial court would have made a finding of good faith belief in a life estate if it had been asked, we are not 
certain. Because it is not our place to find facts, see id. at 830-31 (citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
936 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993)), we remand this issue to the trial 
court for additional findings and, if it deems appropriate, for additional evidence on the good faith issue. 
^ If it concludes that some or all of the claimants have a life estate, then it should enter an order giving 
them a remedy under the Act. 
This does not end this matter, however. Those claimants occupying land in Arizona have no remedy 
under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. Therefore, we must still determine whether the trial court 
properly granted that group of claimants an equitable remedy under Arizona law. Similarly, if on 
remand, the trial court determines that some or all of the Utah claimants did not have a good faith belief 
in a life estate, we must determine if the court properly granted these claimants an enrichment equitable 
remedy under Utah law. 
The UEP argues that the trial court erred in granting claimants equitable relief for two reasons: first, a 
court cannot assess the equities between religious entities; and, second, because claimants knew that the 
UEP owned the land, there is nothing inequitable about the UEP's keeping the improvements without 
compensating the claimants. Before addressing these issues, we note that we will analyze the trial court's 
equity ruling under both Arizona and Utah law because the court's equitable remedy affects real property 
in both Arizona and Utah. See Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law 235 (1971) (providing that 
existence of equitable interest in land is usually governed by local law of situs of property). Therefore, 
we review the ruling affecting Arizona land under Arizona law and the ruling affecting Utah land under 
Utah law.® Even though we apply the substantive law of two states, we still apply our own standard of 
review for all claims because standard of review is an issue inextricably tied to the forum, as we have 
previously noted. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266-67 (Utah 1993). We now turn to our 
analysis. 
The UEP first argues that the religious context of this case should prohibit a court from applying unjust 
enrichment principles. Essentially, the UEP argues that balancing the equities between the UEP and 
claimants is tantamount to judging the fairness of the UEP's religious practices and is therefore 
prohibited. We first note that under our Utah precedents, an issue of law, such as this, is reviewed for 
correctness and without deference to the trial court. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. On this law, we find 
nothing that would suggest that courts are not competent to hear cases involving religious entities. 
Under both Arizona and Utah law, courts have broad authority to grant equitable relief as needed. See 
Murdock-Bryant Constr., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1197, 1202 (Ariz. 1985); see also Arizona v. Arizona 
Pension Planning, 739 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc); Commercial Cornice & Millwork, Inc. v. 
Camel Constr. Servs. Corp., 739 P.2d 1351, 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); American Towers Owners 
Assoc, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, 930 P.2d 1182, 1192-93 (Utah 1996); Concrete Prods. Co. v. Salt Lake 
County, 734 P.2d 910 (Utah 1987); Baugh v. Darley, 184 P.2d 335 (Utah 1947). And nothing in the 
general rules of equity applicable in both states prohibits a court from deciding an equity case because 
the parties are religious entities. The UEP has cited no Arizona or Utah law suggesting that a court 
should limit the application of the doctrine of unjust enrichment solely because of the religious nature of 
the relationship and motivation of the UEP and claimants. And federal constitutional law imposes no 
such limitation. United States Supreme Court precedent suggests that courts may entertain property 
disputes between religious organizations. In Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), the Court stated: 
Thus, the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving 
church property disputes. It is obvious, however, that not every civil court decision as to property 
claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment. Civil courts 
do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church 
property. Bu t . . . the Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes 
without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. 
Id. at 449. The limitations of which the Supreme Court spoke have no application here because no 
question of church doctrine is central to this case. We therefore conclude that in Arizona and Utah 
nothing prevents a civil court from hearing an ordinary equity case between religious entities or factions, 
or between a religious entity and a private litigant/ ' 
The UEP's second argument is that because the claimants knew they did not own the land, there is 
nothing inequitable about the UEP's keeping the improvements without compensating claimants. We 
first address the standard of review. The determination that the UEP was unjustly enriched by the 
claimants is a mixed question of law and fact. We uphold a lower court's findings of fact unless the 
evidence supporting them is so lacking that we must conclude the finding is "clearly erroneous." See 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). As 
stated earlier, we assume competent and substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings because 
appellant did not provide a transcript on appeal. See Goodman 589 P.2d at 760. In contrast, we review a 
trial court's conclusions as to the legal effect of a given set of found facts for correctness. See Pena, 869 
P.2d at 936. Although we review legal questions for correctness, we may still grant a trial court 
discretion in its application of the law to a given fact situation. As we explained in Pena, we decide how 
much discretion to give a trial court in applying the law in a particular area by considering a number of 
factors pertinent to the relative expertise of appellate and trial courts in addressing those issues. See id. 
at 938-39. Factors weighing in favor of broad discretion include: (i) whether "the facts to which the legal 
rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all 
these facts can be spelled out"; (ii) whether "the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is 
sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate definitively 
what factors should be outcome determinative"; and (iii) whether "the trial judge has observed 'facts,' 
such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be 
adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts." Id. at 939. A factor weighing against 
broad discretion is whether there are reasons of policy that require standard uniformity among trial 
courts addressing the question. See id. 
We will address each of the Pena factors to determine the degree of discretion appellate courts should 
confer on trial courts when reviewing the legal conclusion that a set of facts does or does not warrant a 
conclusion that unjust enrichment has been shown. First, the facts underlying an unjust enrichment 
claim are often complex and vary greatly from case to case. Indeed, by its very nature, the unjust 
enrichment doctrine developed to handle fact situations that did not fit within a particular legal standard 
but which nonetheless merited judicial intervention. See Restatement of Restitution, intro. n. (1937) 
(noting that narrow early common law causes of actions posed difficulties and required creation of 
chancery courts because "there were so many situations in which one justly entitled to recover was not 
able to do so"). Because the fact patterns in unjust enrichment cases are generally complex and varying, 
the first Pena factor favors providing the trial court with broad discretion in applying the law to fact 
situations. 
The second Pena factor addresses whether appellate courts have sufficient experience with an area of 
law and the situation to which the law applies that they are capable of articulating clearly and definitely 
the outcome determinative factors. It is true that the unjust enrichment doctrine has ancient roots, and 
courts have had a great deal of opportunity to apply it. However, the court's ability to state clearly the 
outcome-determinative factors remains elusive. The Arizona Supreme Court, in discussing the equitable 
rules it applies, and which we apply here, notes the rales' indeterminativeness: 
The circumstances of this case are somewhat unique.... The Restatement of Restitution . . . does not 
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cover the factual circumstances presented by the case at bench. This is not determinative, however, 
because the remedy of restitution is not confined to any particular circumstance or set of facts. It is, 
rather, a flexible, equitable remedy available whenever the court finds that "the defendant, upon the 
circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity" to make compensation for 
benefits received. 
We have also recognized the rationale for restitutionary relief, stating that restitution . . . is available "as 
a matter of reason and justice from the acts and conduct of the parties and circumstances surrounding the 
transactions,. . . and [is] imposed for the purpose of bringing about justice without reference to the 
intentions of the parties. 
Murdock-Bryant Constr., 703 P.2d at 1202 (citations omitted); see also Commercial Cornice & 
Millwork, 739 P.2d at 1356; Arizona Pension Planning, 739 P.2d at 1375. We cannot adequately predict 
in any detail the elements in a situation such as the present that will or will not definitely merit an unjust 
enrichment remedy. Therefore, this Pena factor favors granting the court below a broad degree of 
discretion in applying the law. 
The third Pena consideration is whether non-record evidence, such as demeanor, is available to the trial 
court and not the appellate court. Our discussion of the first two factors indicates that the record in an 
unjust enrichment case generally will not reflect considerations crucial to a trial court's ruling. This is 
particularly true when the trial court hears contradictory evidence from witnesses about the transaction's 
circumstances and must examine the relevance of each party's acts and conduct, and assess credibility 
and demeanor. The present case presents an unusual circumstance: the UEP did not provide a copy of 
the transcript from the six-week trial. This significantly impairs this court's ability to understand all the 
facts relevant to the trial court's ruling and gives us a further reason to conclude that in this case this 
factor favors broad discretion. 
The fourth Pena factor, one countervailing to those favoring broad discretion, asks if there are policy 
reasons requiring uniformity among trial courts addressing these issues in similar fact circumstances. 
This factor seems weak in this case. First, fact situations will vary greatly in most unjust enrichment 
cases. Second, such a finding will not generally implicate substantial constitutional interests. See Pena, 
869 P.2d at 938-39. We therefore find nothing here that would outweigh the factors favoring broad 
discretion. Unjust enrichment law developed to remedy injustice when other areas of the law could not. 
Unjust enrichment must remain a flexible and workable doctrine. Therefore, we afford broad discretion 
to the trial court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the facts. 
We now turn to our analysis of the trial court's application of the law. Arizona recognizes the equitable 
remedy of unjust enrichment and generally provides that '"[a] person who has been unjustly enriched at 
the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other."' Murdock-Bryant Constr., 703 P.2d 
at 1202 (quoting Restatement of Restitution 1 (1937)). A person is unjustly enriched if (i) he received a 
benefit, and (ii) his retention of that benefit would be unjust. See Flooring Systems, Inc. v. Radisson 
Group, Inc., 772 P.2d 578, 581 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc). We find that the trial court correctly concluded 
that claimants proved both elements. 
Regarding the first element, the trial court found: "There can be no doubt from the evidence presented 
that [claimant] has conferred a benefit on the UEP by improving the lot." Arizona law defines a benefit 
as "any form of advantage." Artukovich & Sons, Inc. v. Reliance Truck Co., 614 P.2d 327, 329 (Ariz. 
1980) (en banc). In making its finding, the court relied on evidence showing that the claimants spent a 
considerable amount of money and time improving the UEP land, that these improvements increased the 
value of the land, and that the UEP will benefit from the increased value. We agree that this evidence 
supports the finding that the UEP received some advantage, and, thus, a benefit. 
1 /90/9006 
The claimants must also show that the UEP's retention of these benefits would be unjust. The UEP 
argues that because the claimants knew that the UEP owned the land and because the claimants intended 
to "donate" the improvements, they cannot recover. We disagree. 
In determining whether it would be unjust to allow the retention of benefits without compensation, 
Arizona law provides that a court need not find that the defendant intended to compensate the plaintiff 
for the services rendered or that the plaintiff intended that the defendant be the party to make 
compensation. This is because the duty to compensate for unjust enrichment is an obligation implied by 
law without reference to the intention of the parties. What is important is that it be shown that it was not 
intended or expected that the services be rendered or the benefit conferred gratuitously, and that the 
benefit was not "conferred officiously." 
Murdock-Bryant Constr., 703 P.2d at 1203 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Pyeatte 
v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Flooring Systems, 772 P.2d at 581. Thus, 
under Arizona law, the trial court had to find that (i) services were conferred, (ii) the services were not 
conferred "officiously," and (iii) it was not intended that the services were "gratuitously" conferred. As 
we explained above, the trial court found that the claimants conferred a benefit on the UEP--they 
rendered services by improving the UEP lots. 
As to the second element, the claimants plainly did not confer the services officiously. "Officiousness 
means interference in the affairs of another not justified by the circumstances under which the 
interference takes place." Restatement of Restitution 2 cmt. a (1937). Thus, an officious person is one 
who "thrust[s] benefits upon others." Id. Here, the claimants did not interfere or thrust benefits on the 
UEP. To the contrary, the UEP encouraged the claimants to improve the land. The trial court found: 
There can also be no doubt that the trust was aware of the benefit as its representatives encouraged the 
construction and the improvement of the lot by the occupant and watched the building going in. The 
issue is whether, given the facts of this case, it would be inequitable to allow the UEP to retain the 
benefit without compensation. . . . The Court is of the opinion that such a result would be inequitable. 
Finally, the claimants did not confer their services gratuitously. One renders services gratuitously if at 
the time they were rendered, there was no expectation of "a return benefit, compensation, or 
consideration." Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 992 (3d ed. 1961); see also 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Restitution 
26 (1973). We conclude that because the claimants built the improvements with the intention that they 
could occupy them for their lifetimes, they did not confer them gratuitously. 
The Restatement of Restitution, which Arizona courts follow in the absence of contrary authority, see 
Bank of America v. J. & S. Auto Repairs, 694 P.2d 246, 248 (Ariz. 1985), is instructive in determining 
whether one rendered services gratuitously. Section 40 provides: 
A person who has rendered services to another . . . is entitled to restitution therefor if the services were 
rendered . . . in the mistaken belief, of which the other knew or had reason to know, that the services 
would inure to the benefit of the one giving them . . . . 
Restatement of Restitution 40 (1937). Thus, one who renders services with the reasonable expectation of 
a returned benefit does not render the services gratuitously. Section 42 of that Restatement, which limits 
a party's right to recovery for improvements to land/10^ 
specifies that section 40 applies when the true owner, "having notice of the error and of the work being 
done, stands by and does not use care to prevent the error from continuing." Id. 42 cmt. b. A comment to 
section 40 clarifies that an owner "cannot retain a benefit which knowingly he has permitted another to 
confer upon him by mistake." Id. 40 cmt. d. 
The trial court concluded that the claimants "expected to use the property into the foreseeable future" 
and "[a]s a result [they] invested lots of money and time in the improvement of the property." The court 
also found that the claimants improved the land with the knowledge and encouragement of the UEP and 
with the understanding that they could remain on the land for their lifetimes. The court further indicated 
that the UEP failed to disabuse claimants of their beliefs that they could remain on the land for their 
lifetimes. The court stated: 
The UEP must bear a large share of the blame for the confusion as to the terms of occupancy since it did 
not communicate to [claimants] directly the conditions of [their] occupancy . . . even though the trust 
was engaged in a long term and wide spread program of settling its people on UEP lands. It would have 
been easy to prepare a list of conditions of occupancy and to distribute the list to those preparing to 
invest heavily in improvements with the encouragement and agreement of the trust. 
Applying the law to these facts, we conclude that the trial court's disposition was adequately supported 
by the evidence and was consistent with the Arizona substantive law. We therefore find that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the UEP to allow claimants to live on the land for their 
lifetimes or to compensate them for the improvements. 
We next consider the trial court's unjust enrichment ruling under Utah law, as that law governs the 
claims of any Utah residents who may not be covered by the Occupying Claimants Act or for whom an 
equitable remedy is more favorable. Utah law, like Arizona's, recognizes the remedy of unjust 
enrichment. A party may prevail on an unjust enrichment theory by proving three elements: 
'"(1) a benefit conferred on one person by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of 
the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances 
as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.'" 
American Towers Owners, 930 P.2d at 1192 (citations omitted). Although these elements are phrased 
differently than Arizona's, we find the analysis to be much the same. 
Regarding the first two elements, the trial court, as discussed above, found that claimants conferred a 
benefit by improving the property and that the UEP knew about, and, indeed, encouraged the 
improvements. 
We addressed the third element in Baugh v. Darley, 184 P.2d 335 (Utah 1947). This court stated: 
Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which injustice and 
equity belong to another. The benefit may be . . . beneficial services conferred . . . . 
Services officiously or gratuitously furnished are not recoverable. Nor are services performed by the 
plaintiff for his own advantage, and from which the defendant benefits incidentally, recoverable. 
Id. at 337 (internal citations omitted). Here, the claimants improved the land in reliance upon the UEP's 
representations that they could live on the land for the rest of their lives. Even though the claimants 
intended to benefit from the improvements by occupying them during their lifetimes, the claimants' 
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services still conferred a direct, not incidental, benefit on the UEP. Thus, we uphold the trial court's 
equitable remedy for all claimants, both those occupying land in Arizona and Utah. 
The UEP next argues that the trial court's particular equitable remedy violates both article I, section 4 of 
the Utah Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because the ruling 
burdens the free exercise of its members' religious beliefs. Specifically, the UEP asserts that the ruling is 
unconstitutional because it measures "religious expression against secular standards of fairness."*• -^  
When presented with a constitutional challenge to a law, we presume the law is valid. See Society of 
Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993). A party mounting such a challenge 
bears a heavy burden to overcome this presumption, and '"we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality.'" Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1997) (quoting Society of 
Separationists, 870 P.2d at 920). Moreover, when a party asserts claims under both the Utah and federal 
Constitutions, this court ordinarily first determines the issue under the Utah Constitution and only 
resorts to the federal Constitution if the state constitution is not dispositive. See West v. Thomson 
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004-07 (Utah 1994). 
With this in mind, we first address whether the trial court's equitable ruling violates article I, section 4 of 
the Utah Constitution. It provides: 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any person be 
incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence thereof. There shall be no 
union of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its functions. No 
public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property qualification shall be 
required of any person to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
Utah Const, art. I, 4 (emphasis added). The UEP argues this section provides greater protection for 
religious institutions than the federal constitution. Accordingly, it asks this court to hold that any law 
that in any way burdens free exercise violates article I, section 4 unless the proponent of the law shows 
that it is supported by a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of accomplishing that 
end. 
This proposed test does not come from the language of the constitution or from our case law, which has 
never addressed this question. Rather, the UEP grounds its proposed test on two United States Supreme 
Court decisions under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). It is noteworthy, however, that the Supreme 
Court's most recent cases decided under the Free Exercise Clause state that the compelling interest test 
of Yoder and Sherbert is not the prevailing federal constitutional test. Rather, under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment, a state law that incidentally burdens the exercise of religion is not 
unconstitutional so long as the law is not intended to burden free exercise, is of general applicability, 
and is otherwise valid. See Employment Div. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) 
(stating that Supreme Court decisions "have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not 
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on 
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes)'" (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).^^ 
We have never determined whether the free exercise clause of article I, section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution provides protection over and above that provided by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. And we do not decide that question today: even if we assume, arguendo, that the 
compelling interest test the UEP proposes applies, the UEP cannot prevail on the facts of this case. 
Because the UEP's state constitutional claim fails under the more rigorous compelling state interest test, 
we need not consider the UEP's federal First Amendment claim because it is governed by the less 
rigorous test articulated in Smith. See 494 U.S. at 879. 
We now turn to an application of the compelling state interest test. Under the test advanced by the UEP, 
a facially neutral law may "offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly 
burdens the free exercise of religion." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220. However, a law that burdens free exercise 
is nonetheless constitutional if it furthers a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of 
accomplishing that interest. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-408; see also 
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). For purposes of 
applying this test only, we will assume that the trial court's ruling burdened the UEP members' free 
exercise rights.^^ Thus, we must determine if the court's ruling is the least restrictive means of 
accomplishing a compelling state interest. We conclude that it is. 
A compelling state interest is a "paramount" interest, one of "the highest order." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 
407. The UEP argues that the interest at issue is requiring one church body to maintain religious 
dissenters on church lands or monitoring the fairness of a religious program, and it argues that neither of 
these interests is compelling. The UEP, however, misstates the relevant interest. 
We conclude that the state's interest here revolves around the judicial system, not the specific results of 
the judicial action. This is because the UEP contends that no remedy could be returned by the trial court 
on these claims without violating the state constitution. The state has a compelling interest in ensuring 
that all parties are able to resolve legal disputes before a neutral tribunal. Utah's open courts provision 
states: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation shall have a remedy by due course of law." Utah const, art. I, 11. This provision ensures that 
courts are to be accessible to all for the resolution of their disputes and makes clear that this right to 
come into court is a fundamental value of our governmental compact. See Berry ex. rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985) ("The clear language of the section guarantees access to 
the courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality."); Bracken v. Dahle, 251 P. 16, 
20 (Utah 1926) ("The right to apply to the courts for relief for the perpetration of a wrong is a substantial 
right."). While this clause may not guarantee any specific remedy, it certainly guarantees access to the 
courts. See generally Berry, 717 P.2d at 675. 
If we were to accept the UEP's claim that we should refuse to resolve the claimants' case solely because 
of the assertion that Utah's courts cannot resolve disputes between religious entities, that refusal would 
deny this fundamental right to the claimants. In addition, such a refusal of a remedy alone might 
constitute an action violative of state or federal Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. As one scholar 
has reasoned: 
Although the application of a unique set of legal principles developed in the context of the first 
amendment [and article I, section 4] jurisprudence may be required to evaluate the impact of 
governmental activity on religious concerns, these unique principles should not apply for resolving 
internal religious disputes. In such a dispute, the most important value to maintain is equality between 
religious factions. Without equality of treatment, courts risk establishing one religious faction at the 
expense of the free exercise of the other religious faction. 
Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 
Am. U.L. Rev. 513, 515 (1990). Another scholar summarized the problem as follows: 
It would be simple indeed to deal with all these conflicts with a policy of noninvolvement.... But 
courts serve neither the church nor its members by placing their affairs in a special law-free zone. Law 
free is also lawless, and the consequence is that neither the faithful, nor the church or those with which it 
deals, can rely on the other parties playing by the rules, for there are then no enforceable rules. 
Ira M. Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1378, 1444(1981). 
We conclude that courts must treat property disputes between religious factions "in the same manner 
they treat disputes among other voluntary associations." Gerstenblith, supra, 39 Am. U.L. Rev. at 520. In 
the present case, by resolving the dispute between the UEP and claimants, the trial court furthered the 
compelling state interest in keeping the courts open. Therefore, we find the UEP's claim would fail even 
if we were to adopt the test it suggests. The trial court's award was carefully crafted to be the least 
restrictive means available to further the state's compelling interest. The remedy provided the claimants 
redress for their injuries in a manner that minimizes the burden upon free exercise. The court's ruling 
allows the UEP to force the claimants off the UEP land at any time. The UEP need only compensate 
claimants first for the benefits it received. The court's adjudication of this matter did not violate article I, 
section 4. 
We now turn to the claimants' cross appeal, which urges this court to reverse the trial court and hold that 
the UEP is a private trust, not a charitable trust. The claimants make this assertion because the trial 
court's conclusion that the UEP trust is charitable denied claimants standing to assert their breach of 
fiduciary duty, accounting, and distribution claims. See Restatement of Restitution 391 (1959). 
The trial court based its conclusion that the trust is charitable on a number of facts: the trust states that it 
is charitable; the document designated no specific beneficiaries; that members of the trust have no 
entitlement to benefits because the trustees have discretion to distribute benefits as they see fit; and 
future members' consecrations to the trust buy them nothing. Specifically, the court stated: 
The Court has found, based on the evidence presented at trial and the clear language and unambiguous 
portions of the declaration, that the creators of the trust were motivated by their religious beliefs to 
create a trust to hold title to property donated by adherents to their religious faith, including themselves, 
and to engage in business enterprises for the benefit of the followers of the Work. 
The trial court relied on extrinsic evidence relating to the intentions of the trusts' original settlors. 
However, in determining whether a trust is charitable, a court must look to the language of the trust 
instrument and may not look beyond it unless the instrument's language does not resolve the issue. Cf. 
Olivas v. Board of Nat'l Missions of Presbyterian Church, 405 P.2d 481, 485 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); see 
also Restatement (Second) of Trusts 38 (1959) (providing that parol evidence rule applies to 
interpretation of trusts). Therefore, we review the language of the trust first. This review of the trust 
instrument is a question of law. See In re Ferguson, 929 P.2d 33, 35 (Colo. Ct. App. 1 9 9 8 ) . ^ If we 
find no ambiguity, we need not consider the extrinsic evidence relied on by the trial court. 
"A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising as a result of a 
manifestation of an intention to create it, and subjecting the person by whom the property is held to 
equitable duties to deal with property for a charitable purpose." Restatement (Second) of Trusts 348; see 
also State ex rel. Goddard v. Coerver, 412 P.2d 259, 263 (Ariz. 1966). "A fundamental distinction 
between [private trusts and charitable trusts] is that in a private trust property is devoted to the use of 
specified persons who are designated as beneficiaries of the trust; whereas a charitable trust has as a 
beneficiary a definite class and indefinite beneficiaries within the definite class, and the purpose is 
beneficial to the community." Olivas, 405 P.2d at 485. Thus, a charitable trust has two essential 
requirements: indefinite beneficiaries and a purpose beneficial to the community. 
We turn to the first element, the indefmiteness of the beneficiaries. In order to qualify as a charitable 
trust, the trust instrument must indicate that "the persons who are to benefit are . . . of a sufficiently large 
or indefinite class so that the community is interested in the enforcement of the trust." Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts 375. In a charitable trust, "the beneficial interest is not given to individual 
beneficiaries, but the property is devoted to the accomplishment of purposes beneficial to the 
community." Id. 364 cmt. a. Thus, if a trust only names specific beneficiaries, the trust is not charitable 
even if it has a charitable purpose such as relieving the named beneficiaries from poverty, providing 
them education, or promoting their religious welfare. Cf. id. 375 cmt. b; id. 371 cmt. f (providing that "a 
trust for the religious benefit of persons designated by name . . . is not a charitable trust"). 
The Declaration of Trust provides: 
it is understood and agreed that we and such other members as may hereafter come into said association 
are associated together merely and solely for purposes of being cesti que trustents [sic] of the trust 
hereby created, thus being entitled to equitable and beneficial interests of all profits and property, both 
personal, real and mixed, of the trust estate created, in accordance with their just wants and needs as 
determined from time to time by the Board of Trustees and as the trust estate may be able to respond 
thereto . . . . 
Membership in the trust estate is established for the signers of this instrument... by conveyance to the 
trust estate of the following property . . . . Evidence of membership shall be shown in the books of the 
association. 
Further and additional membership shall be established and added by the consecration of such property . 
Declaration of Trust (Nov. 9, 1942) (emphasis added). Thus, the UEP trust document states that the 
signers of the instrument became trust members and associated "for purposes of being cesti que trustents 
of the trust." Cestui que truste are "[t]he beneficiar[ies] of a trust." Blacks Law Dictionary 229 (6th ed. 
1990). From its inception, the trust benefitted specific individuals. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
concluding that the trust had no specific beneficiaries and was charitable. 
The trial court also relied on several other factors in concluding that the trust was charitable. These 
factors were that (i) the members received nothing for their consecrations, (ii) the document states that 
the trust is charitable, and (iii) the trust grants the trustees sole discretion to distribute benefits. We have 
reviewed these factors and conclude that as a matter of law, none of them make the trust charitable. 
First, we cannot agree with the trial court that members' consecrations buy them nothing. The trust 
instrument clearly contemplates that beneficiaries must consecrate property to benefit from the trust. But 
that does not make it charitable. One scholar has noted: 
If members of a large group make contributions toward a common fund, to be administered by trustees, 
the income and capital to be used to furnish help to the contributors or their relatives if they are sick, 
disabled, or out of work, the courts do not treat the trust as charitable, but rather as a private trust or as 
giving contractual rights in the nature of insurance. They lay stress on the fact that the [beneficiaries] 
have purchased their benefits. It is said sometimes that in the case of a true charitable trust, those to be 
aided must be suppliants, and must take their benefits gratuitously. 
George E. Bogert, The Law of Trusts 138 (4th ed. 1963). The UEP trust gives a beneficial interest to 
named individuals—the members. To become a member, an individual must consecrate property to the 
trust. We conclude that under these circumstances, the consecration requirement is not indicative of a 
charitable trust. 
Second, we find the trust's declaration to be non-determinative under the circumstances. The declaration 
states, "The purpose and object of the trust shall first be charitable and philanthropic." Declaration of 
Trust, VIII. In an Arizona case in which the language of a testamentary trust attempted to devise 
property to specific heirs and to create a charitable trust with the residue of the estate, the Arizona 
Supreme Court stated: 
although the clear intention of the testatrix was that the trustees . . . should apply the residue of her estate 
in ways beneficial to the Town of Paonia, or the Paonia schools, her good intentions alone cannot create 
a valid charitable trust where the language of the clause makes it possible for the property to be devoted 
to purposes other than "charitable" as defined by the law. 
In re Hayward's Estate, 178 P.2d 547, 550 (Ariz. 1947). This reasoning applies here. Even though the 
settlors called the trust charitable, they structured the trust so that it would benefit specific individuals. 
In short, the settlors declared intentions cannot overcome other operative language in the trust making it 
a private trust. 
Finally, we address the trial court's conclusion that the trust is charitable because the trust grants the 
trustees sole discretion to distribute benefits. We agree that the trust language bestows such discretion; 
however, we disagree with the trial court's conclusion that vesting discretion in a trustee makes a trust 
charitable. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides that a settlor may create a discretionary trust. 
Comment d to section 128 provides: "By the terms of the trust it may be provided that the trustee shall 
pay to or apply for a beneficiary only so much of the income and principal or either as the trustee in his 
discretion shall see fit to pay or apply." Restatement (Second) of Trusts 128 cmt. d (emphasis added). 
Thus, nothing prohibits a settlor from giving the trustee of a private trust discretionary power over 
distributions. Because that trust names specific beneficiaries and because nothing else in the trust 
overcomes the general rule that naming specific beneficiaries render a trust private, we conclude the 
UEP trust is private. 
In conclusion, we uphold the trial court's equitable ruling allowing claimants to remain on the land for 
their lifetimes or requiring the UEP to compensate the claimants for the benefit it received if the UEP 
seeks to remove claimants. However, we find that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the Utah 
Occupying Claimants Act and that the findings are insufficient for us to determine whether any or all of 
the claimants have life estates. Further, we find that the trial court erred in ruling that the UEP trust is a 
charitable trust. Therefore, we remand that issue to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
Chief Justice Howe, Associate Chief Justice Durham, and Justice Russon concur in Justice 
Zimmerman's opinion. 
Justice Stewart dissents. 
1. Some of the claimants now claim no affiliation with either group. 
2. Only claimants occupying land situated in Utah have an action under Utah's Occupying Claimant Act. 
Arizona has no counterpart to this statute. 
3. Section 57-6-1 was amended in 1995, changing "plaintiff to "owner" and making stylistic change. 
See Utah Code Ann. 57-6-1 (Supp. 1997). 
4. The quoted language is now found in section 57-6-4 (2)(a) (Supp. 1997). 
5. The only restriction intended by the legislature is indicated by the express language of section 57-6-1, 
stating that the Act should not be construed to create any ownership interest in a tenant against a 
landlord. 
6. Because the UEP represented to claimants that they could occupy the land for their lives, so long as 
they did not sell, mortgage, or abandon the property, the claimants* interest is actually a life estate 
subject to a condition subsequent. In other words, the UEP had both a reversionary interest, which vests 
upon the death of a claimant, and the possibility of reverter, which would only vest if a claimant sold, 
mortgaged, or abandoned the property. See Restatement of Property: Future Interests intro. n. & 164 
(1936). 
7. The Utah Occupying Claimants Act provides the following remedy once the court determines that an 
occupier had color of title and made valuable improvements in good faith: 
The plaintiff in the main action may thereupon pay the appraised value of the improvements and take the 
property, but should he fail to do so after a reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the defendant may 
take the property upon paying its value, exclusive of the improvements. If this is not done within a 
reasonable time, to be fixed by the court, the parties will be held to be tenants in common of all the real 
estate, including the improvements, each holding an interest proportionate to the values ascertained on 
the trial. 
Utah Code Ann. 57-6-3. 
8. Although the Utah and Arizona laws of unjust enrichment are very similar, we apply each state's law 
in deference to the general rule that the law of the situs applies. We also note that Arizona law 
recognizes the validity of a foreign state's rulings affecting Arizona land. In Day v. Wiswall, 464 P.2d 
626 (Ariz. 1970), the Arizona Supreme Court analyzed whether a foreign decree requiring a defendant 
to convey Arizona land or an interest therein is entitled to full faith and credit. See id. at 629. 
Concluding that an Arizona court would give such a decree full faith and credit, the court stated: 
If the defendant is personally before a court of equity, why doesn't the court have power to order him to 
convey foreign land? Such a decree is an effective judgment and determines conclusively his obligation 
to convey. This obligation remains binding on the defendant wherever found. Such a decree ought to be 
entitled to full faith and credit at the situs of the land. 
Id. Here, there appears to be no question that we have power to determine the parties' interest in land in 
Arizona. 
9. In declining to adopt the UEP's assertion that the religious context of the parties' relationship 
precludes an equitable award, we do not intend to avoid considering the effect of the parties' religious 
relationship on the appropriateness of the trial court's award, an issue raised by the UEP. However, we 
will consider that question, infra, when we determine the constitutionality of the district court's decision. 
10. Section 42(1) of the Restatement of Restitution, governing improvements upon land or chattels, 
provides: 
Except to the extent that the rule is changed by statute, a person who, in the mistaken belief that he or a 
third party on whose account he acts is the owner, has caused improvements to be made upon the land of 
another, is not thereby entitled to restitution from the owner for the value of such improvement; but if 
his mistake was reasonable, the owner is entitled to obtain judgment in an equitable proceeding or in an 
action for trespass . . . only on condition that he makes restitution to the extent that the land has been 
increased in value by such improvements, or for the value of labor and materials employed in making 
such improvements, whichever is least. 
Restatement of Restitution 42(1) (1937) (emphasis added). Thus, if a person who made improvements 
had a reasonable belief of ownership, the true owner may eject the party who made the improvements 
only after paying restitution for the improvements. 
11. The UEP also argued that the trial court's ruling violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993. See 42 U.S.C. 2000bb to 2000bb-4. However, we do not address this claim because the United 
States Supreme Court recently ruled that the act was unconstitutional. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 
_ U . S _ . , 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997). 
12. In Smith, the Court explained that the only decisions in which it had found a neutral, generally 
applicable law violated the First Amendment involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as . . . the rights of parents . . . 
to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (invalidating 
compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to 
send their children to school). 
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
13. Both parties1 briefs addressed whether the trial court's ruling imposed a "substantial burden" on free 
exercise. The claimants cite a Tenth Circuit case for its argument that before establishing a First 
Amendment violation, a party must first show a substantial burden on religious exercise. See Werner v. 
McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 515 U.S. 1166 (1995). The Tenth Circuit, 
however, decided Werner under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), which Congress 
passed in 1993. See 42 U.S.C. 2000bb to 2000bb-4. RFRA provided: 
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l(b) (emphasis added). Even though both parties integrate the "substantial burden" 
requirement into their constitutional analyses, we need not decide if the compelling state interest 
standard applies only after a showing that the law imposed a "substantial burden" on free exercise. 
Instead, we can assume for this case only that the compelling interest test applies upon a showing that 
the law imposes any burden on free exercise. 
14. Because there is no conflict between the Utah and Arizona law governing this trust, we choose to 
apply Utah law. See Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 1981) (holding that where no significant 
differences exist between Utah law and law of other states, "the court may properly apply Utah law in 
the absence of an affirmative showing that the law of [the other state] is different"(emphasis added)). 
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1 A. Yes, I did. I give them the privilege of living there. 
2 Q. All right. Did there come a time m which you said you 
3 wanted them out of the property? Was there time in which you 
4 said you wanted them out? 
5 A. After all of the trouble that I've had I asked them to 
6 leave, and I told them at the time an agreement that I would give 
7 them each $2500 when they left for what they had done. Instead 
8 of them taking up the offer I had made, they are doing what 
9 they're doing now. 
10 MR. SANDERS: Okay. I believe we covered the issues 
11 that we talked about. If I'm m error, I'll be happy to cover 
12 that. My memgry was --
13 THE COURT: When did he deny them permission? When did 
14 he ask them to leave? 
15 Q. BY MR. SANDERS: When did you ask them to leave the 
16 property? 
17 A. Through the years I told Mark, I said, "Mark, you don't 
18 need a whole house here to live m . I'd like to get it fixed up 
19 and I need to rent it. I have limited means." His reply was, 
2 0 "You always say it but you never do it." With the trouble that: I 
21 haa, I decided m 2002 that I was going to get the property fixed 
22 up and get it rented, get something coming m and that was what I 
2 3 intended to do. 
24 Q. Do you remember a particular time of year or date _n 
2 5 wmch you actually aspect them to leave tne property? 
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4. I always understood myself to be the sole heir of my mother as she had only 
two children and the other child was a brother to me that passed away in childhood. 
. 5. ! always considered the home occupied by my mother until the time of her 
passing to be my house after she passed away. Admittedly, no probate was ever done as 
i had never got around to accomplishing that 
6. ! had knowledge that my sons, Robert and Mark, occupied the home on and 
off with respect to each in the years since my mothers passing until the present time. This 
occupancy was always with my permission until recently. 
7. i personally made repairs in the house and paid for other repairs over time 
Disagreement arose between me and my sons in 2003 oyer payment for maintenance of 
the house. I asked them in 2004 to vacate the premises because of these disagreements. 
8. i paid the property taxes on the home for the calendar year 2002. I am aware 
that my sons paid the property taxes for other years, -which 1 considered to be in lieu of 
psylng rent as they did not pay me rent on the premises. 
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